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a b s t r a c t
Justification logics are refinements of modal logics, where justification terms replace
modalities. Modal and justification logics are connected via the so-called realization
theorems. We develop a general constructive method of proving the realization of a modal
logic in an appropriate justification logic by means of cut-free modal nested sequent
systems. We prove a constructive realization theorem that uniformly connects every
normal modal logic formed from the axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5 with one of its justification
counterparts. We then generalize the notion of embedding introduced by Fitting for
justification logics, which enables us to extend our realization theorem to all natural
justification counterparts. As a result, we obtain a modular realization theorem that
provides several justification counterparts based on various axiomatizations of a modal
logic. We also prove that these justification counterparts realize the same modal logic if
and only if they belong to the same equivalence class induced by our embedding relation,
thereby demonstrating that the embedding provides the right level of granularity among
justification logics.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Justification logic. The language of justification logic is a refinement of the language of modal logic. It replaces the single
modality 2 by a family of the so-called justification terms. While a modal formula 2A can be read as A is provable or A is
known, a justification counterpart t : A of this formula is read as t is a proof of A or A is known for reason t . By introducing
operations on terms, justification logic studies the operational content of modality in various modal logics. In this paper,
we develop a method for testing whether a given set of operations on justifications is sufficient to represent a given modal
logic defined via a nested sequent system. We also apply the method to study comparative strengths of several such sets of
operations.
The first justification logic, called the Logic of Proofs or LP, was introduced by Artemov [1,2] as a stepping stone for
giving an arithmetical semantics for the modal logic S4. Epistemic logic is another promising area of application for
justification logics. For example, as shown in [5], justification logics avoid the well-known logical omniscience problem
because justification terms have a structure and thus provide ameasure of how hard it is to obtain knowledge of something.
The formal correspondence between S4 and LP, called a realization theorem, has two directions. First, it says that each
provable formula of S4 can be turned into a provable formula of LP by realizing, i.e., replacing, instances of modalities with
justification terms. The converse direction says that replacing all terms in a provable formula of LP with modalities results
in a modal formula provable in S4. Similar correspondences have been established for several other modal logics by means
of various proof methods (see an overview in [3]).
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Methods for proving realization. There are essentially two methods of establishing realization theorems: the syntactic
method due to Artemov [1,2] and the semantic method due to Fitting [13]. The syntactic method makes use of cut-free
sequent systems for modal logics, while the semantic method makes use of a Kripke-style semantics for justification logics.
In contrast to the semanticmethod, the syntacticmethod is constructive: it provides an algorithm for computing justification
terms that realize all the occurrences of modalities in a given modal theorem.
The semantic method has been used to prove several realization theorems: for S4, S5, K45, and KD45 [3,13,23]. Prior to
the publication of [10], constructive realizations, via the syntactic method, were available only for K, D, T, K4, D4, S4, and S5
[1,2,4,7,16,17]. In the case of S5, for which no cut-free sequent system is available, two approaches have been used: via
a translation from S5 to K45 [17] in conjunction with the realization merging technique developed in [16] and via a cut-
free hypersequent system [4]. However, neither approach can be applied to other modal logics that lack cut-free sequent
systems, such as K5 and KB.
General realization. In this paper, we develop a general method for proving realization theorems, which applies to a
wide class of modal logics that can be captured by cut-free nested sequent systems consisting of the so-called context-
sharing rules. Nested sequents, which can be viewed as trees of sequents, naturally generalize both sequents, which are
nested sequents of depth zero, and hypersequents, which are essentially nested sequents of depth one. A crucial feature
of these proof systems is deep inference [8,19], which in this case means applying inference rules to formulas arbitrarily
deep inside a nested sequent. We show that in order to realize the modal logic of a nested sequent system, it is enough to
realize the non-nested, or shallow, version of each rule.We apply ourmethod to the nested sequent systems by Brünnler [9]
that capture all the 15 normal modal logics formed by the axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5, which gives us a uniform constructive
realization theorem for these logics. In particular, this proves Pacuit’s conjecture implicit in [22] that J51 is a justification
counterpart of K5. Our method also helps provide justification counterparts for the modal logics D5, KB, DB, TB, and KB5,
which, to our knowledge, did not have justification counterparts prior to the publication of [10].
Embedding and modular realization. Based on our realization method, we discuss the question of modularity of
realizations: each modal axiom has a natural corresponding justification axiom. However, a modal logic may have several
axiomatizations and thus, a priori, may have several justification counterparts, supposedly one for each axiomatization.
These counterpartsmainly differ in the set of operations on justifications they employ.We classify these various justification
counterparts by introducing an embedding relation on them that extends that of Fitting [15]. This embedding gives rise to
an equivalence relation, which is natural in the sense that justification logics are equivalent iff they realize the same modal
logic. The machinery of embeddings enables us to study minimal sets of operations on justifications that are sufficient to
realize a given modal logic. For instance, we have shown that the operation of positive introspection is not necessary to
realize the modal logic S5, although it enjoys positive introspection.
Outline. In Section 2, we introduce justification logics and modal logics. In Section 3, we introduce notation and prove
auxiliary lemmas to be used in the following sections, aswell as recall Fitting’smerging technique. In Section 4, we introduce
nested sequent systems and describe our general method for proving realization theorems.We use this method in Section 5
to prove our central result: the uniform realization theorem. In Section 6, we classify the justification logics using our notion
of embedding and prove a modular realization theorem.
Relationship to previous work. In [10], which was a joint work with Kai Brünnler, we proved a uniform realization
theorem for all the 15 normal modal logics formed by the axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5. The proof of the realization
theorem presented there is a special case of the general method described in this paper. Here, we also prove a modular
realization theorem that provides axiomatization-based justification counterparts for those modal logics among the above-
mentioned 15 that have more than one axiomatization. Note that the definition of justification logics we use here slightly
differs from the one used in [10]. To minimize the number of operations on justifications, the negative introspection
operation ?was used in [10] to realize both themodal axioms 5 and b. However, because of the new definition of embedding
for justification logics, introduced in Section 6 of this paper, it makes more sense to use a new operation ?¯ to realize b and
to establish the exact relationship between the operation ?, typically used to realize 5, and this new ?¯ by exploring the
conditions under which one can be replaced by the other. Another difference from [10] is that justification constants are
assigned levels to make the formulation of the results on embedding more elegant (see Remark 2.2 for details).
2. Justification logics and their modal counterparts
In this section, we define the modal and justification languages, give axiom systems we work with, both modal and
justification, and introduce forgetful projection and realization theorems, which provide a formal connection between these
languages and between these logics. We also explain in detail the naming conventions for axiom systems and logics to be
employed throughout the paper. A reader already familiar with these basics is still encouraged to skim through the section
because the justification language we use is not entirely standard (e.g., constants are divided into levels, and there is a new
operation ?¯).
We start by recalling the languages of modal and justification logics. For modal formulas, we adopt the negation normal
form, with conjunction and disjunction as primary propositional connectives. The negation normal form makes possible
1 Pacuit used the name LP(K5).
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Fig. 1. Themodal cube.
taut: A fixed complete set of propositional axioms
distr: 2(A → B) → (2A → 2B)
A A → B
MP
B
A
N 2A
Fig. 2. The axiom system for the basic normal modal logic K.
the use of one-sided nested sequent calculi for modal logics, which is more common and also minimizes the number of
propositional sequent rules, thereby shortening our proofs. At the same time, justification formulas are given in a more
traditional format, with falsum and implication as primary propositional connectives. As a result, the process of realization
also encompasses a Boolean translation between two complete systems of propositional connectives. Not distinguishing
between primary and defined connectives in either language enables us to perform these translations implicitly, except for
cases where a Boolean transformation affects justification terms.
Modal language.Modal formulas are given by the grammar
A ::= Pi | ¬Pi | (A ∨ A) | (A ∧ A) | 2A | 3A,
where i ranges over positive natural numbers, Pi denotes a proposition, and ¬Pi denotes its negation. The negation operation
is extended from propositions to all formulas by means of the usual De Morgan laws, with ¬¬Pi := Pi. Using this negation
operation, we define (A → B) := (¬A ∨ B). Equivalence is defined as usual, and⊥ := (Pj ∧ ¬Pj) for some fixed proposition Pj.
Justification language. Apart from formulas, the language of justification logic has another type of syntactic objects
called justification terms, or simply terms, that are given by the grammar
t ::= c ji | xi | (t · t) | (t + t) | !t | ?t | ?¯t ,
where i and j range over positive natural numbers, c ji denotes a (justification) constant of level j, and xi denotes a (justification)
variable. The binary operations · and +, which are left-associative, are called application and sum respectively. The
unary operations !, ?, and ?¯ are called positive introspection (or proof checker), negative introspection, and weak negative
introspection respectively. Terms that do not contain variables are called ground and are denoted by p, with or without a
sub- and/or a superscript, whereas arbitrary terms are denoted by t and s, with or without a sub- and/or a superscript. We
use the notation t(xi1 , . . . , xin) for terms that do not contain variables other than xi1 , . . . , xin .
Justification formulas are given by the grammar
A ::= Pi | ⊥ | (A → A) | t : A,
where Pi denotes a proposition, as in the modal language, and t is a justification term. The remaining Boolean connectives
are defined as usual. While writing formulas, we assume that implication is right-associative and that both conjunction and
disjunction bind stronger than implication.
Modal logics and their axiom systems. One of our goals is to prove a uniform realization theorem for all modal logics
in the so-called modal cube from [18] (see Fig. 1). All these logics are extensions of the basic normal modal logic K that are
obtained by taking its axiom system from Fig. 2 and adding to it the modal axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5 from Fig. 3 in various
combinations. Fig. 1 contains only 15 logics for 25 = 32 such axiom systems because several axiom systems may yield one
modal logic. For the modal logics with variant axiomatizations, we distinguish these axiomatizations because we realize
them individually, thereby providing alternative realizations for such modal logics. To this end, we adopt the following
naming conventions. Axiom systems are denoted by listing the (always present) axiom k, followed by the names of the
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d: 2⊥ → ⊥ t: 2A → A b: A → 2¬2¬A
jd: t : ⊥ → ⊥ jt: t : A → A jb: A → ?¯t : (¬t : ¬A)
4: 2A → 22A 5: ¬2A → 2¬2A
j4: t : A → !t : t : A j5: ¬t : A → ?t : (¬t : A)
Fig. 3.Modal axioms and their corresponding justification axioms.
taut: A fixed finite complete set of propositional axioms
app: s : (A → B) → (t : A → (s · t) : B)
sum: s : A → (s+ t) : A and s : A → (t + s) : A
A A → B
MP
B
A is an axiom instanceiAN
cnin : cn−1in−1 : . . . : c1i1 : A
Fig. 4. The axiom system for the basic justification logic J.
axioms added to the axiom system for K from Fig. 2, with all letters capitalized. For example, KD45 is the axiom systemwith
additional axioms d, 4, and 5. If a logic from the cube has only one such axiom system, we use the same notation for both
the logic and the axiom system, except that some logics traditionally have the initial letter ‘K’ omitted from their names: for
instance, the logic of the axiom system KD45 is often called D45.
Two of the logics predate this modular axiomatization and, hence, bear traditional names S4 and S5. The former is
the logic of the axiom systems KT4 and KDT4, while the latter is the logic of the following 13 axiom systems: KT5, KDT5,
KDB4, KTB4, KDTB4, KDB5, KTB5, KDTB5, KT45, KDT45, KDB45, KTB45, and KDTB45. Further, the three axiom systems KB4,
KB5, and KB45 produce the same modal logic, which, following [18], we call KB5. Thus, there is a small ambiguity between
the logicKB5 and the axiom systemKB5, whichwill be resolved by explicit typification, as in this sentence. Finally, the axiom
systems KT and KDT produce the samemodal logic, as do the axiom systems KTB and KDTB. The traditional names for these
logics areM and B respectively. To avoid confusing the latter with the logic KB, where the initial letter is omitted, we use TB
instead of B. By analogy, T is used instead ofM.
Justification logics and their axiom systems. The 15 modal logics of the modal cube are realized into 24 justification
logics that we similarly define as extensions of the basic justification logic J. Its axiom system, also denoted J, consists of
the axioms and rules given in Fig. 4; the iAN-rule is called iterated axiom necessitation. We define the zero-premise iAN-rule
as a rule and not as an axiom to prevent it from referring to itself. The finiteness of the set of propositional axioms in taut is
required for the results on embedding in Section 6 (it is also a standard requirement for proving decidability and estimating
complexity of justification logics). To define extensions of the system J, we add to its axiom system the justification axioms jd,
jt, jb, j4, and j5 from Fig. 3 in various combinations.
The axioms j4 and jt occur already in Artemov [1]; jd and j5 were introduced by Brezhnev [7] and by Pacuit [22]
respectively. The axiom jb, as presented here, is new but has been independently proposed by Meghdad Ghari in an
unpublished manuscript. The idea to use a new operation ?¯ rather than rebrand ? to mimic the modal axiom b is consistent
with the general policy that incomparable axioms should be realized via different operations (cf. Remark 6.19).
Remark 2.1 (Alternative Axiomatizations). Axiomatizations of justification logics that contain the axiom j4 often use a
simpler version of the iAN-rule, called axiom necessitation:
A is an axiom instance
c1i : A
.
Since we are interested in the relationships among justification logics, it is more natural to use the form of axiom
necessitation suitable for all justification logics rather than switch between different versions of the rule (cf. also [3,15]).
Remark 2.2 (Levels of Constants). The assignment of levels to constants is useful for proving the results on embedding in
Section 6. A similar concept of levels was introduced in [21] (see also the definition of constant specification in [3]). Levels
would not be needed for justification logics that contain the axiom j4 if we had chosen the rule from Remark 2.1 instead
of iAN.
Remark 2.3 (Common Language). We have decided to use a common language with all five operations on justifications
for all justification logics to avoid cluttered formulations of lemmas and theorems that apply to all justification logics. For
instance, the operation !, present in the common language, does not occur in Fig. 4 and, hence, has no specialmeaning for the
logic J. As a side effect, in this language, it is not possible to formulate conservativity results for justification logics. Instead
of conservativity results, we introduce a more elaborate relationship among logics that is based on translation of operations
rather than on their presence/absence in the language.
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Naming conventions. The naming conventions for justification logics and their axiom systems are similar to those for
modal logics. For example, the axiom system JB5 is J extended by the axioms jb and j5, and its logic is also denoted JB5. The
only exceptions from the one-axiom-system-per-justification-logic rule are due to the fact that all instances of the axiom jd
are also instances of jt. Hence, adding the axiom jd to an axiom system that already contains jt does not change the logic,
thereby creating for it a second axiomatization. Accordingly, we omit the letter ‘D’ from the names of all the 8 logics with
two axiom systems each. For instance, the logic JT5 is the logic of the axiom systems JT5 and JDT5. Note that in all the other
cases, every two axiom systems yield different logics simply because their sets of axioms are different and so are their sets
of provable formulas of the form c1i : A, where A is an axiom instance and c1i is a constant of level 1.
Unless stated otherwise, from this point on, by a justification logic wemean the logic of either the axiom system J or one
of its extensions. Likewise, by a modal axiom system we mean either the axiom system K or one of its extensions, and by
a modal logic we mean the logic of a modal axiom system. We denote an arbitrary modal axiom system, modal logic, and
justification logic by AS,ML, and JL respectively.
We have named the axiom systems in such a way that eachmodal axiom system has a natural corresponding justification
axiom system, and vice versa. The names of corresponding systems differ only in the first letter: K for a modal axiom system
and J for a justification one. For example, KT45 corresponds to JT45.
Realization theorems. A deeper correspondence between modal and justification logics is established by realization
theorems. The first realization theoremwas proved byArtemov [1,2] for themodal logicS4. It connectsS4with a justification
logic that he called LP, or the Logic of Proofs, and thatwemostly refer to as JT4 (note that JT4 is indeed the justification axiom
system that corresponds to KT4, one of the axiom systems of S4).
Realization theorems are formulated using a natural translation function from justification to modal formulas:
Definition 2.4 (Forgetful Projection and Realization). Given a justification formula A, its forgetful projection A◦ is defined by
induction on the structure of A:
P◦i := Pi, ⊥◦ := ⊥, (A → B)◦ := A◦ → B◦, and (t : A)◦ := 2A◦.
The forgetful projection of a set X of justification formulas is the set of their forgetful projections: X◦ := {A◦ | A ∈ X}.
A justification logic JL realizes a modal logic ML if JL◦ = ML: i.e., if the forgetful projection of the set of theorems of JL is
exactly the set of theorems ofML.
In the next section, we impose an additional standard restriction on realizations: namely, diamonds (i.e., negative boxes)
should be realized by distinct variables.
To date, no systematic study exists of the effects of variant axiomatizations of a modal logic on its realizations. In this
paper, we present such a study and provide realizations that are based on alternativemodal axiomatizations and aremodular
in the following sense: given an axiom systemAS for amodal logicML, the justification axiom system that corresponds toAS
yields a justification logic that realizes ML. To this end, we say that every modal logic ML has one or several justification
counterparts , i.e., the justification logics of justification axiom systems that correspond to one of the modal axiom systems
ofML. In particular, the justification counterparts of KB5 are JB4, JB5, and JB45. The ones for S5 are JT5, JTB5, JDB5, JT45,
JTB45, JDB45, JTB4, and JDB4. Every other modal logic has exactly one justification counterpart, e.g., JD45 for D45.
3. Preparation for realization
Proving realization theorems involves turning provable formulas of a given modal logic into provable formulas of a
corresponding justification logic by replacing occurrences of 2with terms and of3with variables. We employ an induction
on a given sequent-style derivation. In order to describe this constructive procedure, we introduce realization functions that
assign terms to modalities. To distinguish between different occurrences of modalities in a formula, we annotate themwith
distinct natural numbers, using parity to distinguish between 2’s and 3’s. These annotations, which we adopt and adapt
from [16], are purely syntactic devices and have no semantic meaning. In this section, we also describe technical machinery
to be used for operating with realization functions, including their interaction with substitutions. In addition, we formulate
the Internalization Property (Lemma 3.4 and Corollary 3.5) enjoyed by all the justification logics, which is necessary for
proving realization theorems, and state the Merging Theorem by Fitting (Theorem 3.11), which plays a major role in our
method of realization.
Definition 3.1 (Annotations). Annotated modal formulas, or simply annotated formulas, are given by the grammar
A ::= Pi | ¬Pi | (A ∨ A) | (A ∧ A) | 22k−1A | 32lA,
where i, k, and l range over positive natural numbers, Pi and ¬Pi denote a proposition and its negation, as in the unannotated
modal language. If A′ is a modal formula obtained from an annotated formula A by dropping all indices on its modalities,
then we call A an annotated version of A′. An annotated formula is called properly annotated if no index occurs twice in it.
We mostly work with properly annotated formulas, for which the use of negation normal form has a positive effect of
every subformula of a properly annotated formula being itself properly annotated, in contrast to [16].
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(Pi)r := Pi (A ∨ B)r := Ar ∨ Br (32lA)r := ¬r(2l) : ¬Ar
(¬Pi)r := ¬Pi (A ∧ B)r := Ar ∧ Br (22k−1A)r := r(2k− 1) : Ar
Fig. 5. Realization of annotated formulas.
Remark 3.2 (Negation and Substitution of Annotated Formulas). Note that it is not clear how to define the negation operation
for annotated formulas. The obvious definition of ¬2kA as 3k¬A does not work because it does not produce an annotated
formula. In particular, the substitution of annotated formulas for propositions is only possible for positive, i.e., non-negated,
propositions.
We now define realizations as functions from positive natural numbers to terms, with a restriction that the set of even
numbers is in one-to-one correspondence with the set of variables. This restriction, which is called the normality condition,
is standard and corresponds to the intuition that3’s (or negatively occurring boxes if ¬ is a primary connective instead of3)
represent assumptions on what should be provable and that they become Skolem variables if 2’s, existentially read as ‘∃ a
proof,’ are skolemized.
Definition 3.3 (Realization Function). A prerealization function r is a partialmapping frompositive natural numbers to terms.
A prerealization function r is called a realization function if r(2l) = xl whenever r(2l) is defined. A (pre)realization function
on a given annotated formula is one that is defined on all indices of that formula.
If A is an annotated formula and r is a prerealization function on A, then the justification formula Ar is inductively defined
as in Fig. 5. Note that if r is a realization function on 32lA, then (32lA)r = ¬xl : ¬Ar . Further, note that every justification
formula B can be written as B = Ar for some properly annotated formula A and some prerealization function r .
A basic feature of justification logics used extensively in this paper is the Internalization Property, which enables one
to internalize as a term any proof of a formula B, with or without hypotheses. This is formally stated in the lemma below,
originally proved for LP [2].
Lemma 3.4 (Internalization). For any justification logic JL, if
A1, . . . , An ⊢JL B, (1)
then there exists a term t(x1, . . . , xn) such that
s1 : A1, . . . , sn : An ⊢JL t(s1, . . . , sn) : B
for all terms s1, . . . , sn. Note that the term t is ground if n = 0.
Proof Sketch. This can be easily proved by induction on JL-proof (1). For an axiom, the term t is taken to be a constant of
level 1. For an instance of iANwith the outermost constant of level n, the term t is taken to be a constant of level n+ 1. For
a hypothesis Ai, the term t := xi. For a conclusion D of the MP-rule with premises C → D and C , there must exist terms t1
for C → D and t2 for C . The term for D is taken to be t := t1 · t2. 
In our realization proof, we mostly use the following form of Internalization, obtained by using the rule MP and the
Deduction Theorem. The proof of the latter for justification logics can be almost literally adopted from that for classical
propositional logic sinceMP remains the only rule with premises.
Corollary 3.5 (Internalization). For any justification logic JL, if
JL ⊢ A1 → · · · → An → B,
then there exists a term t(x1, . . . , xn) such that
JL ⊢ s1 : A1 → · · · → sn : An → t(s1, . . . , sn) : B
for all terms s1, . . . , sn. The term t is ground if n = 0.
Our general method for proving realization theorems is by induction on the depth of a proof in a nested sequent system
(to be introduced later) for a modal logic. Since realizations of side formulas need not be the same in different premises
of branching rules, these realizations need to be reconciled, which will be done using Fitting’s merging technique [16]. In
order to formulate it, we need additional notation and definitions, especially the notion of substitution, which also plays an
important role in the realization procedure itself.
Definition 3.6 (Additional Notation). Let A be an annotated formula and r be a prerealization function. We define
vars3(A) := {xk | 32k occurs in A},
r  A := r  {i | i occurs in A},
where f  S is the restriction of the partial function f to the set S ∩ dom(f ).
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The following definition is mostly standard (see, e.g., [6]).
Definition 3.7 (Substitution). A substitution, denoted by σ , is a total mapping from variables to terms. For any term t , the
term tσ is inductively defined as follows: cσ := c for any constant c , xσ := σ(x) for any variable x, (∗t)σ := ∗(tσ) for any
unary operation ∗, and (t1 ∗ t2)σ := (t1σ) ∗ (t2σ) for any binary operation ∗. We write Aσ for the formula that is obtained
from A by simultaneously replacing every term t in Awith tσ .
The definition of domain for substitutions differs from the standard one for ordinary functions, such as prerealization
functions. The domain of σ is dom(σ ) := {x | σ(x) ≠ x}. The variable range of σ , denoted by vrange(σ ), is the set of
variables that occur in terms from the set {σ(x) | x ∈ dom(σ )}.
Composition of substitutions is defined as (σ2 ◦ σ1)(x) := σ1(x)σ2 for any variable x. Composition of a substitution with
a prerealization function is defined as (σ ◦ r)(n) := r(n)σ ; in particular, (σ ◦ r)(n) is undefined whenever r(n) is. Finally,
for substitutions σ1 and σ2 with disjoint domains, i.e., with dom(σ1) ∩ dom(σ2) = ∅, their union is a substitution defined
as follows:
(σ1 ∪ σ2)(x) :=

σ1(x) if x ∈ dom(σ1),
σ2(x) if x ∈ dom(σ2),
x otherwise.
A substitution σ lives on an annotated formula A if dom(σ ) ⊆ vars3(A). A substitution σ lives away from an annotated
formula A if dom(σ ) ∩ vars3(A) = ∅.
The following lemma is easily proved by induction on a proof of A (see, e.g., [20]).
Lemma 3.8 (Substitution). If JL ⊢ A for a justification logic JL, then
(1) JL ⊢ Aσ for any substitution σ and
(2) JL ⊢ A[Pi1 → B1, . . . , Pin → Bn], where A[Pi1 → B1, . . . , Pin → Bn] denotes the result of simultaneously replacing all
occurrences of the propositions Pi1 , . . . , Pin in A with the formulas B1, . . . , Bn respectively.
Remark 3.9 (Simultaneous Substitution). In Lemma 3.8(2), we formulate simultaneous substitution of several formulas for
propositions. Naturally, it would have been sufficient to allow only a single such substitution at a time, but this would have
resulted in more cumbersome proofs later on when this lemma is actually used, e.g., in Lemma 5.11. In addition, the proof
for the simultaneous version is exactly the same as for the single-proposition version, and the given formulation is more in
line with Lemma 3.8(1).
Since the process of realizing a modal formula starts with annotating it, a priori the realizability of the formula might
depend on the annotation chosen. The following lemma shows that this is not the case.
Lemma 3.10 (Renaming Annotations). Let JL be a justification logic, A1 and A2 be properly annotated versions of the samemodal
formula A′, and r1 be a realization function on A1 with JL ⊢ (A1)r1 . Then there exists a realization function r2 on A2 such that
JL ⊢ (A2)r2 .
Proof. For every index n of A1, let n′ denote the corresponding index of A2. Since both A1 and A2 are properly annotated,
n′ has the same parity as n. Let the substitution σ be defined as follows:
σ(xm) :=

xn if 2m is an index of A1 and (2m)′ = 2n,
xm otherwise.
For every n > 0, let the realization function r2 be defined as follows:
r2(n) :=

xm if n = 2m is an index of A2,
r1(m)σ if n is an odd index of A2 andm′ = n,
undefined otherwise.
Clearly, r2 is a realization function on A2.
We showby induction on the structure of A′ that (A1)r1σ = (A2)r2 . It then follows by Substitution Lemma3.8 that (A2)r2 is
provable in JL. The base case and the propositional cases are trivial.
Let A′ = 2B′. Then A1 = 2mB1 and A2 = 2nB2 for some odd indicesm and nwithm′ = n and for some properly annotated
formulas B1 and B2, both annotated versions of B′. Then r2(n) = r1(m)σ by definition of r2. By induction hypothesis,
(B1)r1σ = (B2)r2 . Therefore,
(2mB1)r1σ = r1(m)σ : (B1)r1σ = r2(n) : (B2)r2 = (2nB2)r2 .
Let A′ = 3B′. Then A1 = 32mB1 and A2 = 32nB2 for some indices 2m and 2n with (2m)′ = 2n and for some properly
annotated formulas B1 and B2, both annotated versions of B′. Then xmσ = xn by definition of σ . By induction hypothesis,
(B1)r1σ = (B2)r2 . Therefore,
(32mB1)r1σ = ¬xmσ : ¬(B1)r1σ = ¬xn : ¬(B2)r2 = (32nB2)r2 . 
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We now formulate the merging theorem, which is an instance of Theorem 8.2 from [16]. There it is formulated for LP,
but the proof makes use only of the operations + and · and of the Internalization Property. Hence, the theorem also holds
for all justification logics we consider.
Theorem 3.11 (Realization Merging). Let JL be a justification logic, A be a properly annotated formula, and r1, . . . , rn be
realization functions on A. Then there exists a realization function r on A and a substitution σ that lives on A such that
JL ⊢ Ariσ → Ar for i = 1, . . . , n. (Note that it is not assumed that the Ari ’s are provable.)
The following properties are used, often implicitly, in many of the proofs in this paper.
Fact 3.12 (Combinations of Substitutions and Realization Functions). Let A be an annotated formula, σ , σ1, and σ2 be
substitutions, and r be a prerealization function.
(1) σ2 ◦ σ1 is a substitution with dom(σ2 ◦ σ1) ⊆ dom(σ1) ∪ dom(σ2) and vrange(σ2 ◦ σ1) ⊆ vrange(σ1) ∪ vrange(σ2).
Moreover, A(σ2 ◦ σ1) = (Aσ1)σ2;
(2) if dom(σ1) ∩ dom(σ2) = ∅, then dom(σ1 ∪ σ2) = dom(σ1) ∪ dom(σ2);
(3) if dom(σ1) ∩ dom(σ2) = ∅ and vrange(σ1) ∩ dom(σ2) = ∅, then σ1∪. σ2 = σ2 ◦ σ1;
(4) σ ◦ r is a prerealization function with dom(σ ◦ r) = dom(r);
(5) if r is a prerealization function on A, then so is σ ◦ r and Aσ◦r = Arσ ;
(6) if r is a (pre)realization function on A, then so is r  A.
Whenever r , r1, and r2 are realization functions,
(7) if dom(r1) ∩ dom(r2) ⊆ {n | n is even}, then r1 ∪ r2 is a realization function;
(8) if r1 ∪ r2 is a realization function, then dom(r1 ∪ r2) = dom(r1) ∪ dom(r2);
(9) σ ◦ r is a realization function iff xn /∈ dom(σ )whenever r(2n) is defined.
Corollary 3.13. If r is a realization function on an annotated formula A and if a substitution σ lives away fromA, then σ ◦(r  A) is
a realization function on A.
4. A general realization method for nested sequent systems
In this section, we introduce the formalism of nested sequent calculi and describe a general framework for proving
realization theorems based on such calculi. The essence of the method is that realizing arbitrary nested sequent rules can be
reduced to realizing their non-nested (or shallow) versions (Lemma 4.11), which is even simpler than realizing rules of an
ordinary sequent calculus. As a consequence, in order to prove a realization theorem for amodal logic presented via a nested
sequent system, it is sufficient to realize the shallow versions of all the rules of the system (Theorem 4.12). The realization of
various (shallow versions of) nested sequent rules and proofs of actual realization theorems are postponed until Section 5.
Nested sequents. Nested sequents, or simply sequents, are inductively defined as follows: the empty sequence ∅ is a
nested sequent; ifΣ and∆ are nested sequents and A is a modal formula, thenΣ, A andΣ, [∆] are nested sequents, where
the comma denotes concatenation. The brackets of the expression [∆] are called structural box. The corresponding formula
of a sequent Γ , denoted Γ , is inductively defined as follows:
∅ := ⊥; Σ, A :=

Σ ∨ A ifΣ ≠ ∅,
A otherwise; Σ, [∆] :=

Σ ∨ 2∆ ifΣ ≠ ∅,
2∆ otherwise. (2)
We use the letters Γ ,∆,Λ,Π , andΣ with or without a sub- and/or a superscript to denote sequents.
Sequent contexts. A sequent context, or simply context, is a sequent with exactly one occurrence of the symbol { }, called
a hole, which does not occur inside formulas. Contexts are denoted by Γ { }. An inductive definition can be given as follows:
{ } is a context and ifΣ{ } is a context, then so are [Σ{ }] and∆,Σ{ },Π , where∆ andΠ are sequents. For a context Γ { }
and a sequent∆, the sequent Γ {∆} is obtained by replacing the hole in Γ { }with∆. For example, if Γ { } = A, [[B], { }] and
∆ = C, [D], then Γ {∆} = A, [[B], C, [D]].
Sequent contexts are used to formulate nested rules. As an example, the nested version of the exchange rule can be
formulated as follows:
Γ {∆,Σ}
exch
Γ {Σ,∆}. (3)
One of the instances of (3) is

P2 ∧ 3P3, [P1], P1, P1, ¬P1
exch [P1], P1, P2 ∧ 3P3, P1, ¬P1, where context Γ { } = [{ }], [P1, ¬P1] and sequents ∆ =
P2 ∧ 3P3 andΣ = [P1], P1.
In the next section, we provide systems of such rules for all the logics in the modal cube and use these systems to prove
realization theorems for these logics. In this section, however, we treat arbitrary context-preserving nested rules, i.e., rules
of the form
Γ {S1} . . . Γ {Sn}
Γ {S} ,
where n is a non-negative integer, Γ { } denotes an arbitrary context, common for all the premises and the conclusion
of the rule, and S, S1, . . . , Sn are sequent schemas. Each context-preserving nested rule ρ has a shallow version sh-ρ that
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corresponds to the common context being empty, Γ { } = { }:
S1 . . . Sn
S
.
For instance, the shallow version of the nested exchange rule (3) is
∆,Σ
sh-exch
Σ,∆
. From now on, by a nested rule we mean a
context-preserving nested rule.
Contexts provide for an especially simple definition of subsequents:
Definition 4.1 (Subsequent). A subsequent of a given sequentΓ is any sequent∆ such thatΓ = Σ{∆} for some contextΣ{}.
Definition 4.2 (Annotated Sequent). An annotated sequent (context) is a sequent (context) inwhich only annotated formulas
occur and all structural boxes are annotated by odd indices. The corresponding formula of an annotated sequent is an
annotated formula defined as in (2), except that the third case is replaced with
Σ, [∆]k :=

Σ ∨ 2k∆ ifΣ ≠ ∅,
2k∆ otherwise.
Remark 4.3 (Notions Extended from Formulas to Sequents). Many notions, such as an annotated version and proper
annotation, naturally apply to sequents as well. Other notions are extended from (annotated) formulas to (annotated)
sequents by being applied to the corresponding formula of the (annotated) sequent. For instance, a realization function on
an annotated sequent Γ is a realization function on Γ , Γ r := (Γ )r , vars3(Γ ) := vars3(Γ ), etc.
Whenever safe, we do not explicitly distinguish between an annotated formula A and the annotated sequent that consists
of this formula A: e.g., r is a realization function on a formula A iff it is a realization function on the sequent A, which enables
us to call it simply a realization function on A.
We often use the following trivial fact without mentioning it explicitly:
Fact 4.4 (Preservation of Structure in Annotated Versions). If an annotated sequent ∆ is an annotated version of Γ ′{Λ′} for
some context Γ ′{ } and some sequent Λ′, there exists a unique annotated version Γ { } of the context Γ ′{ } and a unique
annotated versionΛ of the sequentΛ′ such that∆ = Γ {Λ}. Moreover, if∆ is properly annotated, so isΛ.
If an annotated sequent Γ is an annotated version of a sequent Γ ′, then its corresponding formula Γ is an annotated
version of Γ ′.
A realization function on a formula A is trivially a realization function on any subformula of A; the same is true for
sequents and their subsequents. Note, however, that realization functions are defined on corresponding formulas rather
than on sequents themselves and that∆ is not in general a subformula of Γ {∆}. The following fact will be used as a matter
of course without explicit mention.
Fact 4.5 (Realization Function on a Subsequent). If r is a realization function on an annotated sequent Γ {∆}, then r is also a
realization function on its subsequent∆.
The following lemma can be easily obtained from the associativity of Boolean disjunction by induction on the structure
of Γ . The lemma is needed because, in general, the formula Γ ,Σ does not coincide with the formula Γ ∨Σ .
Lemma 4.6 (Associativity of Disjunction). For any annotated sequents Γ andΣ , for any realization function r onΣ,Γ , and for
any substitution σ , we have J ⊢ (Σ,Γ )rσ ↔ Σ rσ ∨ Γ rσ .
Definition 4.7 (Annotated Rule Instance). Given an instance of a nested rule
Γ ′{Λ′1} . . . Γ ′{Λ′n}
Γ ′{Λ′} ,
with common context Γ ′{ }, an annotated version of this instance is of the form
Γ {Λ1} . . . Γ {Λn}
Γ {Λ} ,
where Γ { }, Λ1, . . . ,Λn, and Λ are annotated versions of Γ ′{ }, Λ′1, . . . ,Λ′n, and Λ′ respectively, sequents Γ {Λ1}, . . . ,
Γ {Λn}, and Γ {Λ} are properly annotated, and no index occurs in both Λi and Λj for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Note that the
annotated context Γ { } is the same for every premise and the conclusion.
Definition 4.8 (Realizable Rule). An instance
Γ ′{Λ′} of a 0-premise nested rule is called realizable in a justification logic JL
if there exists an annotated version
Γ {Λ} of it and a realization function r on Γ {Λ} such that JL ⊢ Γ {Λ}
r . An instance
Γ ′{Λ′1} . . . Γ ′{Λ′n}
Γ ′{Λ′} of an n-premise nested rule with n > 0 and with common context Γ
′{ } is called realizable
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in JL if there exists an annotated version
Γ {Λ1} . . . Γ {Λn}
Γ {Λ} of it such that for any realization functions r1, . . . , rn on
Γ {Λ1}, . . . ,Γ {Λn} respectively, there exists a realization function r on Γ {Λ} and a substitution σ that lives on each
of Γ {Λi}, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
JL ⊢ Γ {Λ1}r1σ → · · · → Γ {Λn}rnσ → Γ {Λ}r .
A rule is called realizable in JL if all its instances are realizable in JL.
The following fact trivially follows from the definition.
Fact 4.9 (Realizability in Extensions). If a nested rule is realizable in a justification logic JL, then it is also realizable in every
extension of JL.
Remark 4.10 (Realizability of Cut). Currently it is not known whether the cut rule is realizable in J or in some of its
extensions. A more sophisticated definition of realizability may be necessary. Fortunately, all sequent systems we use are
cut-free.
Lemma 4.11 (From Shallow to Nested). For any nested rule ρ , if its shallow version sh-ρ is realizable in a justification logic JL,
then ρ itself is also realizable in JL.
Proof. We prove the lemma for the harder case where ρ has n > 0 premises. The proof for the case when n = 0 is similar
and, hence, omitted. We consider an arbitrary instance
∆′{Λ′1} . . . ∆′{Λ′n}
∆′{Λ′} (4)
of ρ and show that it is realizable in JL. By assumption, its shallow version
Λ′1 . . . Λ′n
Λ′
, which is an instance of sh-ρ, has
an annotated version
Λ1 . . . Λn
Λ
such that for arbitrary realization functions r1, . . . , rn onΛ1, . . . ,Λn respectively, there
exists a realization function r0 onΛ and a substitution σ0 that lives on each ofΛi, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
JL ⊢ (Λ1)r1σ0 → · · · → (Λn)rnσ0 → Λr0 .
We prove a stronger statement, namely that for any annotated context Γ { } such that Γ {Λ1}, . . . ,Γ {Λn}, and Γ {Λ} are
properly annotated and for arbitrary realization functions r1, . . . , rn on Γ {Λ1}, . . . ,Γ {Λn} respectively, there exists a
realization function r on Γ {Λ} and a substitution σ that lives on each of Γ {Λi}, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
JL ⊢ Γ {Λ1}r1σ → · · · → Γ {Λn}rnσ → Γ {Λ}r .
It then follows that the above also holds for some particular annotated context Γ { } = ∆{ } such that∆{Λ1} . . . ∆{Λn}
∆{Λ}
is an annotated version of our arbitrary ρ-instance (4). The proof is by induction on the structure of Γ { }.
Base case Γ { } = { }. Given realization functions r1, . . . , rn onΛ1, . . . ,Λn respectively, take r := r0 and σ := σ0.
Case Γ { } = [Σ{ }]k. Let r1, . . . , rn be realization functions on [Σ{Λ1}]k, . . . , [Σ{Λn}]k respectively. Since
Σ{Λ1}, . . . ,Σ{Λn}, and Σ{Λ} are properly annotated as subsequents of properly annotated sequents [Σ{Λ1}]k, . . . ,
[Σ{Λn}]k, and [Σ{Λ}]k respectively and since r1, . . . , rn are also realization functions onΣ{Λ1}, . . . ,Σ{Λn} respectively,
by induction hypothesis, there exists a realization function r ′ on Σ{Λ} and a substitution σ ′ that lives on each of Σ{Λi}
such that
JL ⊢ Σ{Λ1}r1σ ′ → · · · → Σ{Λn}rnσ ′ → Σ{Λ}r ′ . (5)
By Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a term t(x1, . . . , xn) such that
JL ⊢ r1(k)σ ′ :

Σ{Λ1}r1σ ′

→ · · · → rn(k)σ ′ :

Σ{Λn}rnσ ′

→ t

r1(k)σ ′, . . . , rn(k)σ ′
 :Σ{Λ}r ′ . (6)
Let σ := σ ′ and let
r := r ′  Σ{Λ} ∪ k → tr1(k)σ ′, . . . , rn(k)σ ′ .
Since [Σ{Λ}]k is properly annotated, index k does not occur in Σ{Λ}. Hence, k /∈ dom

r ′  Σ{Λ} and r is a realization
function on [Σ{Λ}]k by Fact 3.12. Now (6) can be rewritten as
JL ⊢ [Σ{Λ1}]kr1σ → · · · → [Σ{Λn}]krnσ → [Σ{Λ}]kr .
For each i = 1, . . . , n, since σ ′ lives onΣ{Λi}, it is obvious that σ = σ ′ lives on [Σ{Λi}]k.
Case Γ { } = ∆,Σ{ },Π . Let r1, . . . , rn be realization functions on
∆,Σ{Λ1},Π, . . . , ∆,Σ{Λn},Π
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respectively. As in the previous case, by induction hypothesis, there exists a realization function r ′ on Σ{Λ} and a
substitutionσ ′ that lives on each ofΣ{Λi} such that (5) holds. It follows fromFact 4.5 that each ri, i = 1, . . . , n, is a realization
function on∆,Π . Since each∆,Σ{Λi},Π is properly annotated and σ ′ lives on eachΣ{Λi}, it lives away from∆,Π . Thus,
by Corollary 3.13, σ ′ ◦ (ri  ∆,Π) is a realization function on ∆,Π , for each i = 1, . . . , n. By Theorem 3.11 (Realization
Merging), there exists a realization function rM on ∆,Π and a substitution σM that lives on ∆,Π such that for each
i = 1, . . . , n
JL ⊢ (∆,Π)σ ′◦(ri∆,Π)σM → (∆,Π)rM . (7)
By Fact 3.12(5), (∆,Π)σ
′◦(ri∆,Π)σM = (∆,Π)riσ ′σM . Therefore, (7) can be rewritten as
JL ⊢ (∆,Π)riσ ′σM → (∆,Π)rM . (8)
From the induction hypothesis (5), it follows by the Substitution Lemma that
JL ⊢ Σ{Λ1}r1σ ′σM → · · · → Σ{Λn}rnσ ′σM → Σ{Λ}r ′σM .
From this and (8), it follows by propositional reasoning that
JL ⊢ Σ{Λ1}r1σ ′σM ∨ (∆,Π)r1σ ′σM → · · · → Σ{Λn}rnσ ′σM ∨ (∆,Π)rnσ ′σM → Σ{Λ}r ′σM ∨ (∆,Π)rM . (9)
Since∆,Σ{Λ},Π is properly annotated and σM lives on∆,Π , it lives away fromΣ{Λ}; so σM ◦

r ′  Σ{Λ} is a realization
function onΣ{Λ} by Corollary 3.13. By Facts 3.12(4), 3.12(7) and 3.12(8), we conclude that
r :=

σM ◦

r ′  Σ{Λ} ∪ (rM  ∆,Π)
is a realization function on∆,Σ{Λ},Π . Let σ := σM ◦σ ′. This σ lives on∆,Σ{Λi},Π for each i = 1, . . . , n by Fact 3.12(1).
By Fact 3.12(5), we have
Σ{Λ}r ′σM = Σ{Λ}r ′Σ{Λ}σM = Σ{Λ}σM◦(r ′Σ{Λ}).
Therefore, we can rewrite (9) as
JL ⊢ Σ{Λ1} ∨ (∆,Π)r1σ → · · · → Σ{Λn} ∨ (∆,Π)rnσ → Σ{Λ} ∨ (∆,Π)r ,
which, by Lemma 4.6, is propositionally equivalent to
JL ⊢ ∆,Σ{Λ1},Πr1σ → · · · → ∆,Σ{Λn},Πrnσ → ∆,Σ{Λ},Πr . 
Theorem 4.12 (Realization of Nested Systems). Let S be a system of nested rules whose shallow versions are realizable in a
justification logic JL. Then for every sequent Γ ′ provable in S there exists a properly annotated version Γ of it and a realization
function r on Γ such that JL ⊢ Γ r .
Proof. By induction on the depth of a proof of the sequent Γ ′ in S. By Lemma 4.11, all rules used in this proof are realizable
in JL. If Γ ′ is the conclusion of an instance of a 0-premise rule, the statement of the lemma follows from the fact that this
rule is realizable in JL. Let Γ ′ = ∆′{Λ′} be the conclusion of an instance
∆′{Λ′1} . . . ∆′{Λ′n}
∆′{Λ′} (10)
of an n-premise rule ρ with common context ∆′{ }, where n > 0. Since ρ is realizable in JL, there exists an annotated
version
∆{Λ1} . . . ∆{Λn}
∆{Λ} of the ρ-instance (10) such that for any realization functions r1, . . . , rn on∆{Λ1}, . . . ,∆{Λn}
respectively, there exists a realization function r on ∆{Λ} and a substitution σ that lives on each of ∆{Λi}, i = 1, . . . , n,
such that
JL ⊢ ∆{Λ1}r1σ → · · · → ∆{Λn}rnσ → ∆{Λ}r . (11)
By induction hypothesis, for each i = 1, . . . , n, there exists a properly annotated version ∆i{Λi} of the premise ∆′{Λ′i}
and a realization function r i on ∆i{Λi} such that JL ⊢ ∆i{Λi}r i . Since ∆{Λi} is another properly annotated version of the
same premise∆′{Λ′i}, by Lemma 3.10, there exists a realization function ri on∆{Λi} such that JL ⊢ ∆{Λi}ri .
Let r and σ be obtained from the realizability of ρ for these functions r1, . . . , rn. By the Substitution Lemma, JL ⊢
∆{Λi}riσ for each i = 1, . . . , n. It now follows from (11) by n applications of MP that JL ⊢ ∆{Λ}r . It remains to note
that∆{Λ} is a properly annotated version of the conclusion∆′{Λ′} = Γ ′ of the rule instance (10). 
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id
Γ {Pi, ¬Pi}
Γ {A, B}
∨
Γ {A ∨ B}
Γ {A} Γ {B}
∧
Γ {A ∧ B}
Γ {A, A}
ctr
Γ {A}
Γ {∆,Σ}
exch
Γ {Σ,∆}
Γ {[A]}2
Γ {2A}
Γ {[A,∆]}
k
Γ {3A, [∆]}
Γ {[A]}
d
Γ {3A}
Γ {A}
t
Γ {3A}
Γ {[∆], A}
b
Γ {[∆,3A]}
Γ {[3A,∆]}
4
Γ {3A, [∆]}
Γ {[∆],3A}
5a
Γ {[∆,3A]}
Γ {[∆], [Π,3A]}
5b
Γ {[∆,3A], [Π]}
Γ {[∆, [Π,3A]]}
5c
Γ {[∆,3A, [Π]]}
Fig. 6. Rules of nested sequent calculi.
D T KB K4 K5 DB D4 D5 TB K45 S4 KB5 D45 S5
d t b 4 5 d, b d, 4 d, 5 t, b 4, 5 t, 4 b, 4, 5 d, 4, 5 t, 4, 5
Fig. 7. Additional rules in nested sequent systems for modal logics.
5. The realization theorem
In this section, we use Theorem 4.12 to prove a uniform realization theorem for all the modal logics: i.e., we prove that
the shallow versions of the rules of various nested sequent systems for our modal logics are realizable. This leads to a series
of lemmas—essentially one for each rule—of which contraction (Lemma 5.8) is the most interesting one. While there is
no principal difference in the treatment of modal rules (Lemmas 5.9 and 5.15), some of the rules require extra work. In
this respect, the rules that are used in logics with negative introspection have turned out to be the hardest. In order to
make their presentation more readable, we separate parts of the argument into auxiliary lemmas (Lemmas 5.10–5.13 and
Corollary 5.14).
Remark 5.1 (Merging and the Contraction Rule). It is interesting to note that while dealing with contraction (Lemma 5.8)
is one of the main challenges of our method, it did not create any problems for Fitting in [16], where he applies a similar
method to sequent calculi. For an advanced reader, it might be useful to ponder on the roots of such an inequality. Merging,
which plays a crucial role both in Fitting’s and in our method, prohibits repetitions in the annotation, forcing us to annotate
the formulas being contracted in a nested sequent differently and prompting the explicit reconciliation of the annotations as
detailed in Lemma 5.8. In contrast, Fitting merged things on a formula level and, thus, was able to use the same annotation
for the formulas being contracted. The richer structure of nested sequents with its structural modalities, which also require
merging, prevents us from using the same trick.
Remark 5.2 (Merging and the Conjunction Rule). Note that, whereas dealing with the shallow versions of all the logical
propositional rules is equally trivial, the case of conjunction would be significantly more complicated in the actual
implementation of our constructive procedure. This is due to the fact that conjunction is the only multi-premise rule, by
virtue of which the use of merging in Lemma 4.11 is essential for its nested version.
Consider the inference rules in Fig. 6. The sequent system SK consists of the rules id, ∨, ∧, ctr, exch, 2, and k. It corresponds
to the axiom system K. Extensions of the system SK are obtained by adding further rules from Fig. 6 according to Fig. 7, where
adding 5means that all the three rules 5a, 5b, and 5c are added. Note that a name in the first row of Fig. 7 now simultaneously
denotes (1) a logic, (2) an axiom system, and (3) a sequent system.
These sequent systems are essentially the same as the ones in [9], where their completeness is proved, so we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 (Completeness). The system SK and its extensions are sound and complete with respect to their corresponding
modal logics.
Lemma 5.4 (id-Rule). The shallow version of the id-rule is realizable in J.
Proof. Since J ⊢ Pi ∨ ¬Pi, the nowhere defined realization function r := ∅ suffices. 
Lemma 5.5 (∨- and Exch-Rules). The shallow versions of the rules ∨ and exch are realizable in J.
Proof. For an arbitrary instance
A′, B′
A′ ∨ B′
of sh-∨, let an annotated sequent A, B be a properly annotated version of its premise.
Then
A, B
A ∨ B
is an annotated version of this instance. For any realization function r1 on the annotated sequent A, B, let r := r1
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and σ be the identity substitution. Then A, B = A ∨ B = A ∨ B. Hence, A, Br1 σ → A ∨ Br is a propositional tautology and,
thus, is provable in J.
For an arbitrary instance
∆′,Σ ′
Σ ′,∆′
of sh-exch, let annotated sequents ∆ and Σ be annotated versions of ∆′ and Σ ′
respectively such that the sequent ∆,Σ is a properly annotated version of the premise ∆′,Σ ′. Then
∆,Σ
Σ,∆
is an annotated
version of this instance. For any realization function r1 on ∆,Σ , let r := r1 and σ be the identity substitution. Then
J ⊢ (∆,Σ)r1σ → (Σ,∆)r follows from Lemma 4.6. 
The realizability for the 2-rule is trivial:
Lemma 5.6 (2-Rule). The shallow version of the 2-rule is realizable in J.
Lemma 5.7 (∧-Rule). The shallow version of the ∧-rule is realizable in J.
Proof. For an arbitrary instance
A′ B′
A′ ∧ B′
of sh-∧, let an annotated sequent A ∧ B be a properly annotated version of its
conclusion. Then
A B
A ∧ B
is an annotated version of this instance since A and B do not share indices. For arbitrary realization
functions r1 and r2 on the annotated sequents A and B respectively, let r := (r1  A) ∪ (r2  B) and σ be the identity
substitution. The former is a realization function on A ∧ B by Facts 3.12(6) and 3.12(8). Finally, Ar1σ → Br2σ → (A ∧ B)r is a
propositional tautology and, thus, is provable in J since (A ∧ B)r = Ar1σ ∧ Br2σ . 
Lemma 5.8 (ctr-Rule). The shallow version of the ctr-rule is realizable in J.
Proof. For an arbitrary instance
A′, A′
A′
of sh-ctr, let annotated sequents A1, A2 and A3 not share indices and be properly
annotated versions of its premise and conclusion respectively. Then
A1, A2
A3
is an annotated version of this instance. Let r1 be
a realization function on A1, A2. Let B3 be a subformula occurrence of A3 and let B1 and B2 denote the subformula occurrences
in A1 and A2 respectively that correspond to B3 in A3. By induction on the structure of B3, we construct a realization function r
on B3 and a substitution σ with vrange(σ ) ⊆ vars3(B3) that lives on B1 ∨ B2 such that
(B1 ∨ B2)r1σ → (B3)r (12)
is provable in J. Recall that A1, A2, and A3 are all annotated versions of A′ and, hence, have the ‘‘same’’ structure. Note also
that r1 is clearly a realization function on B1 ∨ B2 for any subformula occurrence B3 of A3.
Base case: B3 = Pi or B3 = ¬Pi. In this case, B1 = B2 = B3 and, independent of σ and r , (12) can be rewritten as
B3 ∨ B3 → B3, a propositional tautology provable in J. Hence, one can take σ to be the identity substitution and r := ∅.
To prove the induction step, the following cases have to be considered:
Case B3 = D3∨C3. Then B1 = D1∨C1 and B2 = D2∨C2. By induction hypothesis, there exist realization functions r ′D and r ′C
on D3 and C3 respectively, as well as substitutions σ ′D and σ
′
C with vrange(σ
′
D) ⊆ vars3(D3) and vrange(σ ′C ) ⊆ vars3(C3)
that live on D1 ∨ D2 and C1 ∨ C2 respectively, such that
J ⊢ (D1 ∨ D2)r1σ ′D → (D3)r
′
D and J ⊢ (C1 ∨ C2)r1σ ′C → (C3)r
′
C .
By the Substitution Lemma,
J ⊢ (D1 ∨ D2)r1σ ′Dσ ′C → (D3)r
′
Dσ ′C and J ⊢ (C1 ∨ C2)r1σ ′Cσ ′D → (C3)r
′
Cσ ′D. (13)
Since C1 and D1, C2 and D2, and C3 and D3 are subformulas of A1, A2, and A3 respectively, the latter three pairwise sharing
no indices, it follows that dom(σ ′C ) ⊆ vars3(C1 ∨ C2) is disjoint from vrange(σ ′D) ⊆ vars3(D3). Further, dom(σ ′C ) is also
disjoint from dom(σ ′D) ⊆ vars3(D1 ∨ D2) because, in addition, D1 ∨ C1 and D2 ∨ C2 are properly annotated. It follows from
Fact 3.12(3) that σ ′D ∪ σ ′C = σ ′C ◦ σ ′D. Let σ := σ ′D ∪ σ ′C . Then (D1 ∨ D2)r1σ ′Dσ ′C = (D1 ∨ D2)r1σ and σ lives on B1 ∨ B2 by
Fact 3.12(2). It can be similarly shown that vrange(σ ′C ) ⊆ vars3(C3) is disjoint from dom(σ ′D) and, hence, σ = σ ′D ◦ σ ′C , so
that (C1 ∨ C2)r1σ ′Cσ
′
D = (C1 ∨ C2)r1σ . By Fact 3.12(1), vrange(σ ) ⊆ vars3(D3) ∪ vars3(C3) = vars3(B3). So σ is a suitable
substitution and (13) can be rewritten as
J ⊢ (D1 ∨ D2)r1σ → (D3)r ′Dσ ′C and J ⊢ (C1 ∨ C2)r1σ → (C3)r
′
Cσ ′D. (14)
Since σ ′C and σ
′
D live away from D3 and C3 respectively, by Corollary 3.13, both rD := σ ′C ◦ (r ′D  D3) and rC := σ ′D ◦ (r ′C  C3)
are realization functions on D3 and C3 respectively. By Fact 3.12(5), we have (D3)r
′
Dσ ′C = (D3)rD and (C3)r
′
Cσ ′D = (C3)rC . Now
(14) can be rewritten as
J ⊢ (D1 ∨ D2)r1σ → (D3)rD and J ⊢ (C1 ∨ C2)r1σ → (C3)rC .
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Finally, by propositional reasoning, it is provable in J that
(D1 ∨ C1) ∨ (D2 ∨ C2)
r1σ → (D3)rD ∨ (C3)rC ,
which is exactly (12) for r := rD∪rC . It is easy to see, using Fact 3.12, that r is a realization function on the properly annotated
formula B3 = D3 ∨ C3.
Case B3 = D3 ∧ C3 is analogous to B3 = D3 ∨ C3.
Case B3 = 32nC3. Then B1 = 32kC1 and B2 = 32mC2. By induction hypothesis, there exists a realization function r ′ on C3
and a substitution σ ′ with vrange(σ ′) ⊆ vars3(C3) that lives on C1 ∨C2 such that J ⊢ (C1 ∨C2)r1σ ′ → (C3)r ′ . By propositional
reasoning,
J ⊢ ¬(C3)r ′ → ¬(C1)r1σ ′ and J ⊢ ¬(C3)r ′ → ¬(C2)r1σ ′.
By Internalization Property 3.5, there exist terms t1(x1) and t2(x1) such that
J ⊢ xn : ¬(C3)r ′ → t1(xn) :

¬(C1)r1σ ′

and J ⊢ xn : ¬(C3)r ′ → t2(xn) :

¬(C2)r1σ ′

.
It then follows by propositional reasoning that
J ⊢ ¬t1(xn) :

¬(C1)r1σ ′

∨ ¬t2(xn) :

¬(C2)r1σ ′

→ ¬xn : ¬(C3)r ′ . (15)
Since dom(σ ′) ⊆ vars3(C1 ∨ C2) ∌ xn (indeed, 32n occurs in B3, which shares indices with neither B1 nor B2), the
substitution σ ′ affects neither t1(xn) nor t2(xn) because they contain no variables other than xn. As a consequence, (15) can
be rewritten as
J ⊢ ¬t1(xn) : ¬(C1)r1 ∨ ¬t2(xn) : ¬(C2)r1σ ′ → ¬xn : ¬(C3)r ′ .
Let σ ′′ := {xk → t1(xn); xm → t2(xn)} ∪ {xi → xi | i /∈ {k,m}}. By the Substitution Lemma and since xn /∈ {xk, xm},
J ⊢ ¬t1(xn) : ¬(C1)r1 ∨ ¬t2(xn) : ¬(C2)r1σ ′σ ′′ → ¬xn : ¬(C3)r ′σ ′′. (16)
Since σ ′′ lives away from C3 (indeed, 32k and 32m occur in B1 and B2 respectively, neither of which shares indices with B3),
we know by Corollary 3.13 that σ ′′ ◦ (r ′  C3) is a realization function on C3. In addition, (C3)r ′σ ′′ = C3σ ′′◦(r ′C3). Therefore,
(16) can be rewritten as
J ⊢ ¬t1(xn) : ¬(C1)r1 ∨ ¬t2(xn) : ¬(C2)r1σ ′σ ′′ → ¬xn : ¬(C3)σ ′′◦(r ′C3). (17)
Let σ := σ ′′◦σ ′ and r := σ ′′◦(r ′  C3)∪{2n → xn}. Clearly, r is a realization function on B3. Since σ ′ affects none of xk, xm,
t1(xn), or t2(xn), (17) can be rewritten to state the provability in J of (32kC1 ∨ 32mC2)r1σ → (32nC3)r , which is exactly (12).
It remains to note that, by Fact 3.12(1),
dom(σ ) ⊆ dom(σ ′) ∪ dom(σ ′′) ⊆ vars3(C1 ∨ C2) ∪ {xk, xm} = vars3(32kC1 ∨ 32mC2)
and also vrange(σ ) ⊆ vrange(σ ′) ∪ vrange(σ ′′) ⊆ vars3(C3) ∪ {xn} = vars3(32nC3).
Case B3 = 2mC3. Then B1 = 2kC1 and B2 = 2lC2. By induction hypothesis, there exists a realization function r ′ on C3 and
a substitution σ ′ with vrange(σ ′) ⊆ vars3(C3) that lives on C1 ∨ C2 such that J ⊢ (C1 ∨ C2)r1σ ′ → (C3)r ′ . By propositional
reasoning and Internalization Property 3.5, there exist terms t1(x1) and t2(x1) such that
J ⊢ r1(k)σ ′ :

(C1)r1σ ′

→ t1

r1(k)σ ′
 : (C3)r ′ and J ⊢ r1(l)σ ′ : (C2)r1σ ′ → t2r1(l)σ ′ : (C3)r ′ .
By the axiom sum, for s := t1

r1(k)σ ′
+ t2r1(l)σ ′,
J ⊢ r1(k)σ ′ :

(C1)r1σ ′

→ s : (C3)r ′ and J ⊢ r1(l)σ ′ :

(C2)r1σ ′

→ s : (C3)r ′ .
Thus, by propositional reasoning,
J ⊢ r1(k) : (C1)r1 ∨ r1(l) : (C2)r1σ ′ → s : (C3)r ′ . (18)
Let σ := σ ′ and r := (r ′  C3)∪{m → s}. Clearly, r is a realization function on B3, σ lives on C1∨C2, or equivalently on B1∨B2,
and vrange(σ ) ⊆ vars3(C3) = vars3(B3). Now (18) can be rewritten to state the provability in J of (2kC1 ∨ 2lC2)r1σ →
(2mC3)r , which is exactly (12).
It remains to note that (12) for B3 = A3 and for thus constructed r and σ is

A1, A2
r1 σ → A3r . 
Lemma 5.9 (k-Rule). The shallow version of the k-rule is realizable in J.
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Proof. For an arbitrary instance
[A′,∆′]
3A′, [∆′]of sh-k, let [A,∆]k and32mA, [∆]i beproperly annotated versions of its premise and
conclusion respectively. Then
[A,∆]k
32mA, [∆]i is an annotated version of this instance. Let r1 be an arbitrary realization function
on [A,∆]k. Consider the propositional tautology (A,∆)r1 → ¬Ar1 → ∆r1 . By Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a
term t(x1, x2) such that
J ⊢ r1(k) : (A,∆)r1 → xm : ¬Ar1 → t

r1(k), xm
 :∆r1 .
It follows by propositional reasoning that
J ⊢ r1(k) : (A,∆)r1 → ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ t

r1(k), xm
 :∆r1 . (19)
The indices 2m and i cannot occur in either A or∆ because 32mA, [∆]i is properly annotated. Hence,
r := (r1  A,∆) ∪

2m → xm; i → t

r1(k), xm

is a realization function on 32mA, [∆]i. For the identity substitution σ and this r , (19) can be rewritten as
J ⊢ [A,∆]kr1σ → 32mA, [∆]ir . 
Lemma 5.15 covers the remaining rules from Fig. 6. The following auxiliary lemmas are used for the part of Lemma 5.15
that concerns the rules 5a, 5b, and 5c. The following lemma provides a uniform realization for the theorem 2(A → B) →
2(B → C) → 2(A → C) of K.
Lemma 5.10 (Syllogism). There exists a term syl(x1, x2) such that for arbitrary terms t1 and t2 and for arbitrary justification
formulas A, B, and C,
J ⊢ t1 : (A → B) → t2 : (B → C) → syl(t1, t2) : (A → C).
Proof. From the propositional tautology (P1 → P2) → (P2 → P3) → (P1 → P3), by Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a
term syl(x1, x2) such that for arbitrary terms t1 and t2,
J ⊢ t1 : (P1 → P2) → t2 : (P2 → P3) → syl(t1, t2) : (P1 → P3).
The desired result now follows from the Substitution Lemma. Note that syl(x1, x2) does not depend on t1, t2, A, B, or C . 
Lemma 5.11 (Internalized Factivity). There exists a term fact(x1) such that for any term s and any justification formula A,
J5 ⊢ fact(s) : (s : A → A).
Proof. From the propositional tautology P1 → P2 → P1, by Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a term t1(x1) such that
J5 ⊢ s : P1 → t1(s) : (P2 → P1) for any term s. Hence, by the Substitution Lemma, for any formula A,
J5 ⊢ s : A → t1(s) : (s : A → A). (20)
Similarly, for ¬P2 → P2 → P1, there exists t2(x1) such that J5 ⊢ ?s :¬P2 → t2(?s) :(P2 → P1) for any term s. By the Substitution
Lemma,
J5 ⊢ ?s : ¬s : A → t2(?s) : (s : A → A)
for any formula A. Since ¬s : A → ?s : ¬s : A is a j5-instance, it follows that
J5 ⊢ ¬s : A → t2(?s) : (s : A → A).
From this, (20), and sum, we have J5 ⊢ fact(s) : (s : A → A) for fact(x1) := t1(x1) + t2(?x1). Note that fact(x1) depends on
neither s nor A. 
The following auxiliary lemma is used in the proofs of Lemmas 5.13 and 6.17.
Lemma 5.12 (Inverse to Negative Introspection, Internalized). There exists a term invnegint(x1) such that for arbitrary
terms t and s and for any justification formula A,
J5 ⊢ s : ¬?t : ¬t : A → invnegint(s) : t : A.
Proof. It follows from propositional reasoning and Internalization property 3.5 that there exists a ground term p such that
J5 ⊢ p : (¬x2 : P1 → ?x2 : ¬x2 : P1) → ¬?x2 : ¬x2 : P1 → x2 : P1. (21)
For a fixed arbitrary constant c1j of level 1, J5 ⊢ c1j :

¬x2 :P1 → ?x2 :¬x2 :P1

by j5 and iAN. From this and (21), by app andMP,
J5 ⊢ (p · c1j ) : (¬?x2 : ¬x2 : P1 → x2 : P1).
Also by app andMP,
J5 ⊢ x1 : ¬?x2 : ¬x2 : P1 → (p · c1j · x1) : x2 : P1.
The statement of the lemma for invnegint(x1) := p·c1j ·x1 now follows from the Substitution Lemma. Note that invnegint(x1)
does not depend on t , s, or A. 
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Lemma 5.13 (Internalized Positive Introspection). There exist terms posint(x1) and t!(x1) such that for any term s and any
justification formula A,
J5 ⊢ posint(s) : s : A → t!(s) : s : A.
Proof. We first show that there exists a term s(x1) such that for any t and A,
J5 ⊢ s(t) : (A → ?t : ¬t : ¬A). (22)
It follows from propositional reasoning and Internalization Property 3.5 that there exists a ground term p such that
J5 ⊢ p : (x1 : ¬P1 → ¬P1) → P1 → ¬x1 : ¬P1.
By Lemma 5.11, for the term fact(x1) constructed there, J5 ⊢ fact(x1) : (x1 : ¬P1 → ¬P1). By app andMP,
J5 ⊢ p · fact(x1) : (P1 → ¬x1 : ¬P1).
For a fixed arbitrary constant c1i of level 1, c
1
i :(¬x1 :¬P1 → ?x1 :¬x1 :¬P1) is provable in J5 by j5 and iAN. Hence, by Lemma5.10,
J5 ⊢ sylp · fact(x1), c1i  : (P1 → ?x1 : ¬x1 : ¬P1).
Now (22) follows from the Substitution Lemma for s(x1) := syl

p · fact(x1), c1i

.
By Lemma 5.12, for the term invnegint(x1) constructed there,
J5 ⊢ ??x1 : ¬?x1 : ¬x1 : P1 → invnegint(??x1) : x1 : P1.
Then, by Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a ground term p2 such that
J5 ⊢ p2 :

??x1 : ¬?x1 : ¬x1 : P1 → invnegint(??x1) : x1 : P1

.
By (22), for t = ?x1 and A = x1 : P1,
J5 ⊢ s(?x1) : (x1 : P1 → ??x1 : ¬?x1 : ¬x1 : P1).
Hence, by Lemma 5.10,
J5 ⊢ syls(?x1), p2 : x1 : P1 → invnegint(??x1) : x1 : P1.
For posint(x1) := syl

s(?x1), p2

and t!(x1) := invnegint(??x1), the statement of the lemma now follows by the Substitution
Lemma. Note that t!(x1) and posint(x1) depend on neither s nor A. 
Corollary 5.14 (Internalized Inverse Positive Introspection). There exists a term invposint(x1) such that for any term s, for any
formula A, and for the term t!(x1) constructed in Lemma 5.13,
J5 ⊢ invposint(s) : ¬t!(s) : s : A → ¬s : A.
Proof. By Lemma 5.13, for the terms posint(x1) and t!(x1) constructed there,
J5 ⊢ posint(x1) :

x1 : P1 → t!(x1) : x1 : P1

.
By propositional reasoning and Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a ground term p such that
J5 ⊢ p :

x1 : P1 → t!(x1) : x1 : P1

→ ¬t!(x1) : x1 : P1 → ¬x1 : P1

.
For invposint(x1) := p · posint(x1), by app andMP,
J5 ⊢ invposint(x1) :

¬t!(x1) : x1 : P1 → ¬x1 : P1

.
The statement of the lemma now follows from the Substitution Lemma. Note that invposint(x1) depends on neither
s nor A. 
Lemma 5.15 (Modal Rules). Letρ ∈ {d, t, b, 4, 5a, 5b, 5c}. The shallow version ofρ is realizable in Jρ , where by Jdwemean JD,
and so on, except for ρ ∈ {5a, 5b, 5c}, where we mean J5.
Proof. We consider an arbitrary instance of sh-ρ for each rule ρ in turn.
Case ρ = d. For an arbitrary instance [A
′]
3A′ of sh-d, let [A]k and 32mA be properly annotated versions of its premise and
conclusion respectively. Then
[A]k
32mA is an annotated version of this instance. Consider an arbitrary realization function r1
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on [A]k. From the app-instance
xm : (Ar1 → ⊥) → r1(k) : Ar1 →

xm · r1(k)
 : ⊥ ,
it follows by propositional reasoning that
JD ⊢ r1(k) : Ar1 → xm : (Ar1 → ⊥) →

xm · r1(k)
 : ⊥ .
Using the jd-instance

xm · r1(k)
 : ⊥ → ⊥, we obtain by propositional reasoning
JD ⊢ r1(k) : Ar1 → xm : (Ar1 → ⊥) → ⊥ ,
which is identical to JD ⊢ r1(k) : Ar1 → ¬xm : ¬Ar1 . Since 2m is even, r := r1 ∪ {2m → xm} is a realization function on 32mA
by Facts 3.12(7) and 3.12(8). Thus, for the identity substitution σ and this r ,
JD ⊢ [A]kr1σ → (32mA)r .
Case ρ = t. For an arbitrary instance A
′
3A′ of sh-t, let32mA be a properly annotated version of its conclusion. Then
A
32mA is
an annotated version of this instance. Consider an arbitrary realization function r1 on A. By taking the contraposition of the
jt-instance xm : ¬Ar1 → ¬Ar1 , we have JT ⊢ Ar1 → ¬xm : ¬Ar1 . Since 2m is even, r := r1 ∪ {2m → xm} is a realization function
on 32mA. Thus, for the identity substitution σ and this r ,
JT ⊢ Ar1σ → (32mA)r .
Case ρ = b. For an arbitrary instance [∆
′], A′
[∆′,3A′] of sh-b, let [∆]k, A and [∆,32mA]i be properly annotated versions of
its premise and conclusion respectively. Then
[∆]k, A
[∆,32mA]i is an annotated version of this instance. Consider an arbitrary
realization function r1 on [∆]k, A. Since∆r1 → ∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 is a propositional tautology, by Internalization Property 3.5,
there exists a term t1(x1) such that
JB ⊢ r1(k) :∆r1 → t1

r1(k)
 : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1). (23)
Similarly, for ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → ∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 , there exists a term t2(x1) such that
JB ⊢ ?¯xm : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → t2(?¯xm) : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1).
From this and (23), it follows by the axiom sum and propositional reasoning that
JB ⊢ r1(k) :∆r1 ∨ ?¯xm : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → t : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1)
for t := t1

r1(k)
+ t2(?¯xm). Finally, from the jb-instance Ar1 → ?¯xm : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 , it follows that
JB ⊢ r1(k) :∆r1 ∨ Ar1 → t : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1).
The indices 2m and i do not occur in either∆ or A because [∆,32mA]i is properly annotated. Hence,
r := (r1  ∆, A) ∪ {i → t; 2m → xm}
is a realization function on [∆,32mA]i. Thus, for the identity substitution σ and this r ,
JB ⊢ [∆]k, Ar1σ → [∆,32mA]ir .
Case ρ = 4. For an arbitrary instance [3A
′,∆′]
3A′, [∆′] of sh-4, let [32mA,∆]k and 32mA, [∆]i be properly annotated versions
of its premise and conclusion respectively. Then
[32mA,∆]k
32mA, [∆]i is an annotated version of this instance. Consider an arbitrary
realization function r1 on [32mA,∆]k. Since
xm : ¬Ar1 → ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ ∆r1 → ∆r1
is a propositional tautology, it follows from Internalization Property 3.5 that there is a term s(x1) such that
J4 ⊢ !xm : xm : ¬Ar1 → s(!xm) : (¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ ∆r1 → ∆r1).
From the j4-instance xm : ¬Ar1 → !xm : xm : ¬Ar1 , it then follows by propositional reasoning that
J4 ⊢ xm : ¬Ar1 → s(!xm) : (¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ ∆r1 → ∆r1).
By the axiom app and propositional reasoning,
J4 ⊢ r1(k) : (¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ ∆r1) → ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨

s(!xm) · r1(k)
 :∆r1 .
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The index i does not occur in either∆ or 32mA because 32mA, [∆]i is properly annotated. Hence,
r := (r1  32mA,∆) ∪ {i → s(!xm) · r1(k)}
is a realization function on 32mA, [∆]i. Thus, for the identity substitution σ and this r ,
J4 ⊢ [32mA,∆]kr1σ → 32mA, [∆]ir .
Case ρ = 5a. For an arbitrary instance [∆
′],3A′
[∆′,3A′] of sh-5a, let [∆]k,32mA and [∆,32mA]i be properly annotated versions
of its premise and conclusion respectively. Then
[∆]k,32mA
[∆,32mA]i is an annotated version of this instance. Consider an arbitrary
realization function r1 on [∆]k,32mA. By the propositional tautology∆r1 → ∆r1 ∨¬xm :¬Ar1 and Internalization Property 3.5,
there exists a term t1(x1) such that
J5 ⊢ r1(k) :∆r1 → t1

r1(k)
 : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1). (24)
Similarly, for the propositional tautology ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → ∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 , there exists t2(x1) such that
J5 ⊢ ?xm : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → t2(?xm) : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1).
From the j5-instance ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → ?xm : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 , by propositional reasoning,
J5 ⊢ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → t2(?xm) : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1). (25)
It follows from (24) and (25) by the axiom sum and propositional reasoning that for t := t1

r1(k)
+ t2(?xm),
J5 ⊢ r1(k) :∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → t : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1).
The index i does not occur in either∆ or 32mA because [∆,32mA]i is properly annotated. Hence,
r := (r1  ∆,32mA) ∪ {i → t}
is a realization function on [∆,32mA]i. For the identity substitution σ and this r ,
J5 ⊢ [∆]k,32mAr1σ → [∆,32mA]ir .
Case ρ = 5b. For an arbitrary instance [∆
′], [Π ′,3A′]
[∆′,3A′], [Π ′] of sh-5b, let [∆]k, [Π,32mA]i and [∆,32mA]l, [Π]j be properly
annotated versions of its premise and conclusion respectively. Then
[∆]k, [Π,32mA]i
[∆,32mA]l, [Π]j is an annotated version of this instance.
Consider an arbitrary realization function r1 on [∆]k, [Π,32mA]i. By Corollary 5.14, for the term invposint(x1) constructed
there and the term t!(x1) from Lemma 5.13,
J5 ⊢ invposint(xm) :

¬t!(xm) : xm : ¬Ar1 → ¬xm : ¬Ar1

.
Thus, by app andMP,
J5 ⊢ ?t!(xm) : ¬t!(xm) : xm : ¬Ar1 →

invposint(xm) · ?t!(xm)
 : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 .
From the j5-instance ¬t!(xm) : xm : ¬Ar1 → ?t!(xm) : ¬t!(xm) : xm : ¬Ar1 , it follows that
J5 ⊢ ¬t!(xm) : xm : ¬Ar1 →

invposint(xm) · ?t!(xm)
 : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 . (26)
By propositional reasoning and Internalization Property 3.5, for some ground term p1,
J5 ⊢ p1 :

xm : ¬Ar1 → Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → Π r1

.
Thus, by app andMP,
J5 ⊢ t!(xm) : xm : ¬Ar1 →

p1 · t!(xm)
 : (Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → Π r1).
By app and propositional reasoning,
J5 ⊢ t!(xm) : xm : ¬Ar1 → r1(i) : (Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) →

p1 · t!(xm) · r1(i)
 :Π r1 ,
which is propositionally equivalent to
J5 ⊢ r1(i) : (Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) → ¬t!(xm) : xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1
for s := p1 · t!(xm) · r1(i). From this and (26), by propositional reasoning,
J5 ⊢ r1(i) : (Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) →

invposint(xm) · ?t!(xm)
 : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1 . (27)
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By Internalization Property 3.5, for the propositional tautology ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → ∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 , there exists a term t3(x1) such
that from (27), by propositional reasoning, we obtain the provability in J5 of
r1(i) : (Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) → t3

invposint(xm) · ?t!(xm)
 : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) ∨ s :Π r1 . (28)
Since∆r1 → ∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 is a propositional tautology, by Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a term t4(x1) such that
J5 ⊢ r1(k) :∆r1 → t4

r1(k)
 : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1).
Therefore, by the axiom sum,
J5 ⊢ r1(k) :∆r1 → t : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) (29)
for t := t3

invposint(xm) · ?t!(xm)
+ t4r1(k). Similarly, by (28) and sum,
J5 ⊢ r1(i) : (Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) → t : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) ∨ s :Π r1 . (30)
Finally, by propositional reasoning from (29) and (30),
J5 ⊢ r1(k) :∆r1 ∨ r1(i) : (Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) → t : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) ∨ s :Π r1 .
The indices l and j do not occur in∆,Π , or 32mA because [∆,32mA]l, [Π]j is properly annotated. Hence,
r := (r1  ∆,32mA,Π) ∪ {l → t; j → s}
is a realization function on [∆,32mA]l, [Π]j. For the identity substitution σ and this r ,
J5 ⊢ [∆]k, [Π,32mA]ir1σ → [∆,32mA]l, [Π]jr .
Case ρ = 5c. For an arbitrary instance [∆
′, [Π ′,3A′]]
[∆′,3A′, [Π ′]] of sh-5c, let [∆, [Π,32mA]i]k and [∆,32mA, [Π]j]l be properly
annotated versions of its premise and conclusion respectively. Then
[∆, [Π,32mA]i]k
[∆,32mA, [Π]j]l is an annotated version of this instance.
Consider an arbitrary realization function r1 on [∆, [Π,32mA]i]k. As in the case ρ = 5b, cf. (27),
J5 ⊢ r1(i) : (Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) →

invposint(xm) · ?t!(xm)
 : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1 .
Thus, by propositional reasoning,
J5 ⊢ ∆r1 ∨ r1(i) : (Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1) → ∆r1 ∨

invposint(xm) · ?t!(xm)
 : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1 .
By Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a term s1(x1) such that
J5 ⊢ r1(k) :

∆r1 ∨ r1(i) : (Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1)

→ s1

r1(k)
 : (∆r1 ∨ t3 : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1), (31)
where t3 := invposint(xm) · ?t!(xm). By Lemma 5.11, for the term fact(x1) constructed there,
J5 ⊢ fact(t3) : (t3 : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → ¬xm : ¬Ar1). (32)
By propositional reasoning and Internalization Property 3.5, for some ground term p2,
J5 ⊢ p2 :

(t3 : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 → ¬xm : ¬Ar1) → ∆r1 ∨ t3 : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1 → ∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1

.
From this and (32), by app andMP, it follows that
J5 ⊢ p2 · fact(t3) : (∆r1 ∨ t3 : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1 → ∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1).
It follows by app andMP that
J5 ⊢ s1

r1(k)
 : (∆r1 ∨ t3 : ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1) → t4 : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1)
for t4 := p2 · fact(t3) · s1

r1(k)

. From this and (31), by propositional reasoning,
J5 ⊢ r1(k) :

∆r1 ∨ r1(i) : (Π r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1)

→ t4 : (∆r1 ∨ ¬xm : ¬Ar1 ∨ s :Π r1).
The indices l and j do not occur in∆,Π , or 32mA because [∆,32mA, [Π]j]l is properly annotated. Hence,
r := (r1  ∆,32mA,Π) ∪ {j → s; l → t4}
is a realization function on [∆,32mA, [Π]j]l. For the identity substitution σ and this r ,[∆, [Π,32mA]i]kr1σ → [∆,32mA, [Π]j]lr . 
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Theorem 5.16 (Realization). Let amodal logicML and a justification logic JL be chosen respectively from the first and the second
row of the same column of the following table:
K D T KB K4 K5 DB D4 D5 TB S4 K45 D45 S5 KB5
J JD JT JB J4 J5 JDB JD4 JD5 JTB JT4 J45 JD45 JT45 JB45
Note that the first row contains all the 15 modal logics from the modal cube. Then JL◦ = ML. Moreover, for each A′ ∈ ML, there
exists a properly annotated version A of it and a realization function r on A such that JL ⊢ Ar .
Proof. The inclusion JL◦ ⊆ ML is easy to prove by induction on a proof in JL since the forgetful projections of axioms
of any justification logic are derivable and the forgetful projections of its rules are admissible in the modal logic with the
corresponding axiom system.
Let us now turn to the more interesting opposite inclusion. As discussed at the beginning of this section, with the
exception of the case of the modal logic K, whose sequent system is denoted by SK, ML also denotes the sequent system
(an extension of SK according to Fig. 7) for the modal logic ML. Be it SK or ML for ML ≠ K, this sequent system is
complete with respect to the modal logicML by Theorem 5.3. By Lemmas 5.4–5.9, the rules sh-id, sh-∨, sh-∧, sh-ctr, sh-exch,
sh-2, and sh-k, i.e., the shallow versions of all the rules of the sequent system SK for the modal logic K, are realizable in J. If
ML ≠ K, then JL is an extension of J, so the shallow versions of these nested rules are also realizable in JL by Fact 4.9. Let
ρ ∈ {d, t, b, 4, 5a, 5b, 5c} be one of the remaining rules of the sequent systemML. It is easy to see from the table above and
Fig. 7 that JL is an extension of the justification logic, the realizability of sh-ρ in which is stated in Lemma 5.15. Thus, sh-ρ is
realizable in JL by Fact 4.9. Again, the shallow versions of all the rules ofML are realizable in JL. Let A′ ∈ ML, i.e.,ML ⊢ A′,
for a modal formula A′. By completeness of our sequent system, the sequent A′ is provable in it. Therefore, by Theorem 4.12,
for some properly annotated version A of A′, there exists a realization function r on A such that JL ⊢ Ar . Clearly, (Ar)◦ = A′.
Hence, A′ ∈ JL◦. 
6. Embedding and the modular realization theorem
So far, we have introduced 24 justification logics. However, only 15 of them are connected to a modal logic by
Theorem 5.16. In this section, we define what it means for one logic to embed in another and show that the justification
counterparts (as defined in Section 2) of a modal logic all mutually embed in each other and, hence, are pairwise equivalent.
This enables us to prove amodular realization theorem that connects everymodal logic to all of its justification counterparts,
thus yielding a realization theorem that involves all of the 24 justification logics.
The notion of embedding we introduce is quite natural. Consider the situation in modal logic first. It is common to
formulatemodal logics with a fixed but unspecified complete set of propositional axioms. This creates no ambiguity because
the set of theorems resulting from different axiomatizations remains the same. The only change is that, in general, the proof
of a formula depends on the given axiomatization; in particular, an axiom under one axiomatization may require a more
involved proof under another axiomatization. The situation with justification logics is more nuanced because proofs are
represented in the object language. Therefore, for justification logic, different proofs due to alternative axiomatizations
become different theorems of the logic, the difference being in the terms used. In the above mentioned case of an axiom
turned theorem, a constant that justifies the axiom needs to be replaced with a more complicated term. As a result, an
insignificant change in the propositional axiomatization leads to a different set of theorems, i.e., to a different logic.
The idea that this change of the logic is not significant has been captured by Fitting [15], whowas the first to introduce the
notions of embedding and equivalence of justification logics. In his opinion, the change of a propositional axiomatization
leads to a different but equivalent logic, where equivalence is defined as a two-way embedding. A logic JL1 embeds in a
logic JL2, provided there is amapping from constants of JL1 to terms of JL2 that converts each theorem of JL1 into a theorem
of JL2.
Fitting’s notion of embedding is also sufficient to demonstrate that changing the non-propositional part of the
axiomatization in a provably equivalent way and/or changing the primary Boolean connectives of the logic would lead to
an equivalent logic (in the latter case, provided the embedding also does the appropriate Boolean conversions). However,
as we will soon show, there are justification logics that realize the same modal logic but are not equivalent with respect
to Fitting’s definition. These logics differ in their sets of operations on justifications. For instance, we will demonstrate that
both JT45 and JT5 realize S5, even though JT5 lacks the operation of positive introspection: although ! is present in the
language, the axiom j4 describing its properties is not a theorem of JT5.
To explain in which sense JT5 is equivalent to JT45, consider an analogous situation when Boolean connectives are
changed. If conjunction is not present in the language, it can be defined via primary connectives. We propose to do the same
with operations on justifications. In particular, !missing in JT5 can be defined via the remaining operations. In other words,
j4 can be proved in JT5 if !s is replaced with another term t!(s). Hence, to obtain a sufficiently general notion of equivalence,
we generalize Fitting’s definition of an embedding from 0-ary operations (i.e., constants) to arbitrary n-ary operations.
Informally, we say that JL1 embeds in JL2, provided there is a mapping from operations of JL1 to terms of JL2 that maps
each n-ary operation to a term with n distinct variables such that each theorem of JL1 is converted into a theorem of JL2.
We call such a mapping an operation translation.
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Remark 6.1 (Avoiding Trivial Equivalences). To see why the property of realizing the same modal logic by itself does not
qualify as a definition of equivalence, imagine a ‘‘justification logic’’ that is obtained from JT45 by replacing all the terms
with a single constant. Such a logic trivially realizes S5, but intuitively it should not be considered equivalent to JT45.
Many definitions and results in this section apply to a more general class of justification logics than the one discussed in
this paper. Everything up to Fact 6.11 is general enough to be applicable to logics with any collection of justification terms.
Lemma 6.13 and Theorem 6.14 hold for justification logics that satisfy the Internalization Property and can prove sum. The
remaining results are specific to what we call the extensions of J. Note that all the results also apply to logics with different
languages (recall that all the extensions of J have the same language).
Even though the operations of our logics are at most binary, we want to keep the following definitions as general as
possible. Note that, in this general setting, we use prefix notation also for binary operations.
Definition 6.2 (Operation Translation). Let L1 and L2 be two justification languages. An operation translation ω
(from L1 to L2) is a total function that for each n ≥ 0, maps every n-ary operation ∗ of L1 to an L2-term ω(∗) =
ω∗(x1, . . . , xn). In particular, constants ofL1 aremapped to ground terms ofL2. For anyL1-term t , the term tω is inductively
defined as follows: for any variable xi, xiω := xi; if ∗ is an n-ary operation of L1, n ≥ 0, then
∗(t1, . . . , tn)ω :=
ω∗(t1ω, . . . , tnω). Similarly, for any L1-formula A, the formula Aω is inductively defined as follows: for any proposition Pi,
Piω := Pi; ω distributes through all Boolean connectives; finally, (t : B)ω := (tω) : (Bω).
Whenever safe, we omit parentheses and write, e.g., ∗(t1, . . . , tn)ω instead of
∗(t1, . . . , tn)ω.
As an example, let ? be a unary operation in the language ofL1 and ω(?) = ω?(x1). Then
¬s : A → ?s : ¬s : Aω = ¬(sω) : (Aω) → ω?(sω) : ¬(sω) : (Aω).
Fact 6.3 (Properties of Operation Translation). Letω be an operation translation fromL1 toL2 and let t and A be anL1-term
and anL1-formula respectively. Then
(1) tω is anL2-term and Aω is anL2-formula;
(2) A◦ = (Aω)◦;
(3) for any justification variable x, we have that x occurs in Aω iff x occurs in A.
Definition 6.4 (Embedding and Equivalence). Let JL1 and JL2 be justification logics over languagesL1 andL2 respectively.
We say that JL1 embeds in JL2, written JL1⊆˜JL2, if there exists an operation translation ω fromL1 toL2 such that JL1 ⊢ A
implies JL2 ⊢ Aω for anyL1-formula A. We call JL1 and JL2 equivalent, written JL1 ≡ JL2, if JL1⊆˜JL2 and JL2⊆˜JL1.
By the following two lemmas, equivalent logics realize the same modal logic.
Lemma 6.5 (Equivalence and Forgetful Projection). Let JL1 and JL2 be justification logics over languagesL1 andL2 respectively.
JL1 ≡ JL2 implies (JL1)◦ = (JL2)◦.2
Proof. Weshow that JL1⊆˜JL2 implies (JL1)◦ ⊆ (JL2)◦. The opposite inclusion is analogous. Letω be anoperation translation
that witnesses the embedding JL1⊆˜JL2. Each modal formula B ∈ (JL1)◦ has the form A◦ for some L1-formula A such that
JL1 ⊢ A. By Fact 6.3(1), Aω is anL2-formula. By definition of embedding, JL2 ⊢ Aω. By Fact 6.3(2), (Aω)◦ = A◦ = B. Hence,
B ∈ (JL2)◦. 
The realization theorem from the previous section has an additional requirement that different occurrences of 3 be
realized by distinct variables. This requirement can also be preserved under embeddings:
Lemma 6.6 (Embedding and Realization). Let JL1 and JL2 be justification logics over languages L1 and L2 respectively. Let
JL1⊆˜JL2 and JL1 ⊢ Ar1 for some properly annotated formula A and an L1-realization function r1 on A. Then there exists an
L2-realization function r2 on A such that JL2 ⊢ Ar2 .
Proof. Let ω be an operation translation that witnesses the embedding JL1⊆˜JL2. Then JL2 ⊢ Ar1ω. Define r2(i) := r1(i)ω
so that r2(i) is undefined whenever r1(i) is. Since, by Fact 6.3(1), r1(i)ω is an L2-term whenever r1(i) is defined, r2 is
an L2-prerealization function on A. Whenever r2(2k) is defined, r1(2k) = xk since r1 is a realization function. Hence,
r2(2k) = r1(2k)ω = xkω = xk. Thus, r2 is also a realization function. It is easy to check by induction on the structure
of A that Ar1ω = Ar2 . 
Lemma 6.7 (Extension and Embedding). Let JL1 and JL2 be justification logics over languages L1 ⊆ L2. If JL1 ⊆ JL2, then
JL1⊆˜JL2.
Proof. Let ωid denote the identity operation translation such that ωid(∗) := ∗(x1, . . . , xn) for each n-ary L1-operation ∗.
Since L1 ⊆ L2, clearly ωid is an operation translation from JL1 to JL2. It is easy to show by induction on the structure of
an L1-term t and of an L1-formula A that t = tωid and A = Aωid. Hence, if JL1 ⊢ A, then JL1 ⊢ Aωid, and, consequently,
JL2 ⊢ Aωid. Thus, JL1⊆˜JL2. 
2 Note that the definition of forgetful projection does not depend on which justification terms are used in the logic.
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In order to show that≡ is indeed an equivalence relation, we need the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 6.8 (Operation Translation and Substitution). Let ω be an operation translation from a language L1 to a language L2
and let σ be an L1-substitution. Then for any L1-term t, we have (tσ)ω = (tω)σ ′, where σ ′ is the L2-substitution defined by
σ ′(x) := σ(x)ω for any variable x.
Proof. By induction on the structure of t . If t is a variable x, then (xω)σ ′ = xσ ′ = σ ′(x) = σ(x)ω = (xσ)ω. If t =
∗(t1, . . . , tn) for some n-aryL1-operation ∗, n ≥ 0, then∗(t1, . . . , tn)σ ω = ∗(t1σ , . . . , tnσ)ω = ω∗(t1σ)ω, . . . , (tnσ)ω.
By induction hypothesis, this is the same as
ω∗

(t1ω)σ ′, . . . , (tnω)σ ′
 = ω∗(t1ω, . . . , tnω)σ ′ = ∗(t1, . . . , tn)ωσ ′.
The penultimate equality holds because the only variables that occur in ω∗(t1ω, . . . , tnω) are those that occur in one of
t1ω, . . . , tnω. 
Lemma 6.9 (Equivalence Relation). The relation ⊆˜ is a preorder. Accordingly,≡ is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Since each logic is a trivial extension of itself, it follows from Lemma 6.7 that each logic embeds in itself. Hence, ⊆˜ is
reflexive.
Let JL1, JL2, and JL3 be justification logics over languagesL1,L2, andL3 respectively. Let operation translationsω′ andω′′
witness the embeddings JL1⊆˜JL2 and JL2⊆˜JL3 respectively. We show JL1⊆˜JL3. For every L1-formula A, JL1 ⊢ A implies
JL2 ⊢ Aω′. Accordingly, for everyL2-formula B, JL2 ⊢ B implies JL3 ⊢ Bω′′. Let JL1 ⊢ A for anL1-formula A. It follows that
JL3 ⊢ (Aω′)ω′′. Let ω be defined by ω(∗) := ω′(∗)ω′′ for every n-aryL1-operation ∗, n ≥ 0. Since ω′(∗) is anL2-term with
x1, . . . , xn as its only variables, it follows from Facts 6.3(1) and 6.3(3) that ω′(∗)ω′′ is an L3-term with the same variables.
Hence, ω is an operation translation from L1 to L3. It is now sufficient to show that (Aω′)ω′′ = Aω. To this end, we show
that (tω′)ω′′ = tω for everyL1-term t by induction on the structure of t .
If t is a variable x, then (xω′)ω′′ = xω′′ = x = xω. Let t = ∗(t1, . . . , tn) for some n-aryL1-operation ∗, n ≥ 0. Then∗(t1, . . . , tn)ω′ω′′ = ω′∗(t1ω′, . . . , tnω′)ω′′;
in other words, for theL2-substitution σ := {xi → tiω′ | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {xi → xi | i > n},∗(t1, . . . , tn)ω′ω′′ = ω′(∗)σ ω′′. (33)
By definition, ∗(t1, . . . , tn)ω = ω∗(t1ω, . . . , tnω). By induction hypothesis, this is the same as
ω∗

(t1ω′)ω′′, . . . , (tnω′)ω′′
 = ω(∗)σ ′
for the L3-substitution σ ′ := {xi → (tiω′)ω′′ | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {xi → xi | i > n}. By definition of ω, we have ω(∗)σ ′ =
ω′(∗)ω′′σ ′. Altogether,
∗(t1, . . . , tn)ω =

ω′(∗)ω′′σ ′. (34)
Note that σ ′(x) = σ(x)ω′′ for any variable x. Therefore, by Lemma 6.8, we have ω′(∗)σ ω′′ = ω′(∗)ω′′σ ′ and,
by (33) and (34),
∗(t1, . . . , tn)ω′ω′′ = ∗(t1, . . . , tn)ω. Hence, ⊆˜ is transitive.
Thus, ⊆˜ is a preorder. The definition of ≡ is a standard definition of the equivalence relation induced by the
preorder ⊆˜. 
Our goal is to find sufficient conditions for two logics to embed in each other. Axioms (formula schemas in general) and
constants play a fundamental role in this respect.
Definition 6.10 (Formula Schema). LetL1 be a justification language. AnL1-formula of the form A(x1, . . . , xn, P1, . . . , Pk),
with n, k ≥ 0 and with all variables and propositions indicated, is called a formula representation of anL1-formula schema S.
Then for arbitraryL1-terms t1, . . . , tn andL1-formulas B1, . . . , Bk, the formula A(t1, . . . , tn, B1, . . . , Bk) is called an instance
of S. For a justification logic JL over the languageL1, anL1-schema S is called provable in JL if the formula representation of S
is a theoremof JL. For an operation translationω fromL1 to a justification languageL2, theL2-formula schema represented
by the formula A(x1, . . . , xn, P1, . . . , Pk)ω is denoted by Sω.
All the justification axioms from Figs. 3 and 4 are, in fact, schemas written with variables over terms and variables over
formulas. Fromnowon,wewrite themusing their formula representations instead. For instance, the axiom j4 is nowwritten
as x1 : P1 → !x1 : x1 : P1 instead of t : A → !t : t : A, with a variable over terms t and a variable over formulas A.
Fact 6.11 (Properties of Formula Schemas). Let L1 and L2 be justification languages, S be an L1-formula schema with
formula representation A(x1, . . . , xn, P1, . . . , Pk), JL be a justification logic over L1, and ω be an operation translation
fromL1 toL2. Then
(1) S is provable in JL iff all instances of S are theorems of JL;
(2) if A is an instance of S, then Aω is an instance of Sω.
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Nowwe can finally explain why constants are assigned levels. Suppose we want to embed JTB4 in JDB4. Without levels,
c : c : . . . : c  
m
: (x : P → P)would be provable in JTB4 for any constant c andm ≥ 0. Therefore, we would have to provide an
operation translation ω that maps c to some ground term p such that, in particular, JDB4 ⊢ p : p : . . . : p  
m
: (x : P → P). It can
be shown that for each m, there exists such a term p. However, according to Definition 6.4, we have to choose ω in such a
way that it maps c to a single term p that works for every numberm. This is not possible because such a pwould have to be
infinite. The assignment of levels to constants enables us to map constants of different levels to different ground terms.
Alternatively, we could drop the levels and change Definition 6.4 in such a way that in order to embed a logic in another
one, instead of having a global operation translation, it would be enough to provide a separate operation translation for
every formula. Following Fitting [14], such an embedding could be called local.
Lemma 6.12 (Iterated Internalization of Schemas). Let L be a justification language that has a binary operation +. Let JL be a
justification logic overL that enjoys Internalization Property 3.5 and Substitution Lemma 3.8, in whichMP is an admissible rule
and x1 : P1 → (x1 + x2) : P1 and x2 : P1 → (x1 + x2) : P1 are provable formula schemas, collectively referred to as sum.3 Let
S1, . . . , Sn be L-formula schemas provable in JL. There exists an infinite sequence of ground L-terms p1, p2, . . . such that for
any m > 0 and for anyL-instance A of one of Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have JL ⊢ pm : pm−1 : . . . : p1 : A.
Proof. Let Ai(x1, . . . , xki , P1, . . . , Pli) be a formula representation of Si, i = 1, . . . , n. We show how to construct the term pj,
j = 1, 2, . . . by induction on j. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a ground L-term p1i such
that
JL ⊢ p1i : Ai(x1, . . . , xki , P1, . . . , Pli).
Let p1 := p11 + · · · + p1n. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by using appropriate instances of the schemas sum and the ruleMP, we obtain
JL ⊢ p1 : Ai(x1, . . . , xki , P1, . . . , Pli).
Assume that for somem > 0, we have already constructed groundL-terms p1, p2, . . . , pm such that
JL ⊢ pm : pm−1 : . . . : p1 : Ai(x1, . . . , xki , P1, . . . , Pli)
for all i = 1, . . . , n. We show how to construct pm+1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a
groundL-term pm+1i such that
JL ⊢ pm+1i : pm : . . . : p1 : Ai(x1, . . . , xki , P1, . . . , Pli).
Let pm+1 := pm+11 + · · · + pm+1n . Again, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by instances of sum andMP,
JL ⊢ pm+1 : pm : . . . : p1 : Ai(x1, . . . , xki , P1, . . . , Pli).
Thus, we have constructed an infinite sequence of groundL-terms p1, p2, . . . such that for allm > 0 and for all i = 1, . . . , n,
JL ⊢ pm : pm−1 : . . . : p1 : Ai(x1, . . . , xki , P1, . . . , Pli).
Therefore, JL ⊢ pm : pm−1 : . . . : p1 : A for everyL-instance A of one of Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by the Substitution Lemma. 
Since all the extensions of J have the rule MP and the axiom sum and satisfy both Internalization Property 3.5 and
Substitution Lemma 3.8, we obtain the following
Corollary 6.13 (Iterated Internalization of Schemas for the Extensions of J). Lemma 6.12 holds for any extension JL of J as
defined on p. 5.
Theorem 6.14 (Embedding). Let JL1 and JL2 be two justification logics over languages L1 and L2 respectively. Let the set of
constants ofL1 be divided into levels (cf. page 1273), let→ be one of binary Boolean connectives, and letMP and iAN be the only
rules of JL1. Let JL2 andL2 satisfy all the conditions of Lemma 6.12. Assume the following:
(1) JL1 is axiomatized by finitely many axioms, i.e., formula schemas;
(2) the formula representations of the axioms of JL1 do not contain constants 4;
(3) there exists an operation translation ω from L1 to L2 such that for every axiom S of JL1, the L2-formula schema Sω is
provable in JL2.
Then JL1 embeds in JL2.
3 Earlier in this paper, sum denoted one of the axioms of J. We are using the same name here because these two formula schemas coincide with that
axiom. The only difference is that instead of requiring them to be axioms as before, here we only postulate that all their instances are theorems.
4 Naturally, the axiom instances can contain constants.
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Proof. We have to show that there exists an operation translation ω′ from L1 to L2 such that JL1 ⊢ A implies JL2 ⊢ Aω′
for anyL1-formula A.
Let S1, . . . , Sn be the axioms of JL1. By assumption (3), theL2-schemas S1ω, . . . , Snω are provable in JL2. By Lemma 6.12,
there exists an infinite sequence of ground L2-terms p1, p2, . . . such that for every m > 0 and for every L2-instance B of
one of Siω for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
JL2 ⊢ pm : pm−1 : . . . : p1 : B. (35)
Let the operation translation ω′ be defined as follows:
ω′(∗) :=

pj if ∗ is anL1-constant c ji of level j > 0,
ω(∗) otherwise.
Clearly, ω′ is an operation translation fromL1 toL2.
Let A be an arbitrary theorem of JL1. We show by induction on a JL1-proof of A that JL2 ⊢ Aω′. Note that Aω′ is an
L2-formula by Fact 6.3(1).
If A is an instance of an axiom Si of JL1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then, by Fact 6.11(2), Aω′ is an instance of theL2-formula schema Siω′.
The latter coincideswith theL2-formula schema Siω because the formula representation of Si does not contain any constants
by assumption (2) and ω agrees with ω′ on operations of positive arity. Thus, Aω′ is an instance of the provable schema Siω
and is itself provable in JL2 by Fact 6.11(1).
If A is obtained by the rule iAN, then it is of the form cmim : cm−1im−1 : . . . : c1i1 : B, where B is an instance of an axiom Si for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. As shown in the previous paragraph, Bω′ is then an instance of the formula schema Siω. By (35), we have
JL2 ⊢ pm : pm−1 : . . . : p1 : Bω′, which is the same as JL2 ⊢ Aω′ by definition of ω′.
Finally, if A is obtained by MP from B → A and B, then, by induction hypothesis, JL2 ⊢ Bω′ → Aω′ and JL2 ⊢ Bω′, and,
therefore, JL2 ⊢ Aω′ follows byMP. 
Since conditions (1) and (2) of this theorem hold for any extension of J.
Corollary 6.15 (Embedding for the Extensions of J). Let JL1 and JL2 be two extensions of J as defined on p. 5. If there exists an
operation translation ω from the common language of JL1 and JL2 to the same language such that for every axiom S of JL1, the
formula schema Sω is provable in JL2, then JL1 embeds in JL2.
We now return to our restricted set of justification logics that we call the extensions of J, which all have the same
language. Corollary 6.15 can beused to prove that for everymodal logic, its justification counterparts are pairwise equivalent.
It will be sufficient to provide appropriate operation translations. Moreover, for all such operation translationsω, we can set
ω(+) := x1 + x2 and ω(·) := x1 · x2, as in the identity operation translation, because the axioms sum and app are present
in all the extensions of J.
We proceed to prove that all the justification counterparts of KB5 (among the extensions of J) are pairwise equivalent
and so are those of S5. The following is an auxiliary lemma to be used in the proof of Lemma 6.17.
Lemma 6.16 (Consistency). For arbitrary terms t and s and an arbitrary formula A,
JD ⊢ t : A → ¬s : ¬A .
Proof. From the app-instance s : (A → ⊥) → t : A → (s · t) : ⊥, we obtain by propositional reasoning and the jd-instance
(s · t) : ⊥ → ⊥
JD ⊢ t : A → s : (A → ⊥) → ⊥ ,
which is the same as JD ⊢ t : A → ¬s : ¬A. 
The following lemma is the main ingredient for the construction of operation translations that witness the embeddings
between justification logics.
Lemma 6.17 (Operation Replacement). There exist terms t ′! (x1) and t?(x1) such that for the term t!(x1) constructed in
Lemma 5.13 and for any term s and any formula A,
(1) JT5 ⊢ A → ?s : ¬s : ¬A;
(2) JT5 ⊢ s : A → t!(s) : s : A;
(3) JB5 ⊢ s : A → t ′! (s) : s : A;
(4) JB4 ⊢ ¬s : A → t?(s) : ¬s : A;
(5) JDB4 ⊢ s : A → A;
(6) JDB5 ⊢ s : A → A.
R. Goetschi, R. Kuznets / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 1271–1298 1295
Proof. (1) The formula ¬s : ¬A → ?s : ¬s : ¬A is an instance of j5. Hence, A → ?s : ¬s : ¬A follows by syllogismwith A → ¬s : ¬A,
which is the contraposition of an instance of jt.
(2) By Lemma 5.13, for the terms posint(x1) and t!(x1) constructed there and for any term s and any formula A,
J5 ⊢ posint(s) : s : A → t!(s) : s : A. Since J5 ⊆ JT5, also JT5 ⊢ posint(s) : s : A → t!(s) : s : A. The desired statement now
follows byMP from an instance of jt.
(3) By Lemma 5.12, for the ground term invnegint(x1) constructed there,
J5 ⊢ ?¯?x1 : ¬?x1 : ¬x1 : P1 → invnegint(?¯?x1) : x1 : P1.
The same formula is provable in JB5. Since x1 : P1 → ?¯?x1 : ¬?x1 : ¬x1 : P1 is an instance of jb, for t ′! (x1) := invnegint(?¯?x1),
we have JB5 ⊢ x1 : P1 → t ′! (x1) : x1 : P1 by syllogism. The desired statement now follows by the Substitution Lemma. Note
that t ′! (x1) depends on neither s nor A.
(4) By a propositional tautology and Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a ground term p1 such that JB4 ⊢
p1 : (x1 : P1 → ¬¬x1 : P1). By the axiom app,
JB4 ⊢ !x1 : x1 : P1 → (p1 · !x1) : ¬¬x1 : P1.
By syllogism and the j4-instance x1 : P1 → !x1 : x1 : P1,
JB4 ⊢ x1 : P1 → (p1 · !x1) : ¬¬x1 : P1.
By contraposition and Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a term s1(x1) such that
JB4 ⊢ ?¯(p1 · !x1) : ¬(p1 · !x1) : ¬¬x1 : P1 → s1

?¯(p1 · !x1)
 : ¬x1 : P1.
From the jb-instance
¬x1 : P1 → ?¯(p1 · !x1) : ¬(p1 · !x1) : ¬¬x1 : P1,
it follows by syllogism that ¬x1 : P1 → t?(x1) : ¬x1 : P1 for t?(x1) := s1

?¯(p1 · !x1)

. The desired statement now follows by the
Substitution Lemma. Note that t?(x1) depends on neither s nor A.
(5) By the propositional tautology P1 → ¬¬P1 and Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a term t(x1) such that
J ⊢ x1 : P1 → t(x1) : ¬¬P1. By contraposition and Internalization Property 3.5, there exists a term s2(x1) such that
J ⊢ x2 : ¬t(x1) : ¬¬P1 → s2(x2) : ¬x1 : P1.
Again by contraposition,
J ⊢ ¬s2(x2) : ¬x1 : P1 → ¬x2 : ¬t(x1) : ¬¬P1. (36)
Since JDB4 ⊇ JD, we have JDB4 ⊢ !x1 : x1 : P1 → ¬s2(x2) : ¬x1 : P1 by Lemma 6.16. By the j4-instance x1 : P1 → !x1 : x1 : P1
and syllogism,
x1 : P1 → ¬s2(x2) : ¬x1 : P1 (37)
is provable in JDB4. By syllogismwith (36), JDB4 ⊢ x1 :P1 → ¬x2 :¬t(x1) :¬¬P1. By the Substitution Lemma, JDB4 ⊢ x1 :P1 →
¬?¯t(x1) : ¬t(x1) : ¬¬P1. It follows by the contrapositive ¬?¯t(x1) : ¬t(x1) : ¬¬P1 → P1 of a jb-instance and by syllogism that
JDB4 ⊢ x1 : P1 → P1. The desired statement now follows by the Substitution Lemma.
(6) Since JDB5 ⊇ JB5, we have JDB5 ⊢ x1 : P1 → t ′! (x1) : x1 : P1 by Lemma 6.17(3) for the term t ′! (x1) constructed there.
Since JDB5 ⊇ JD, by Lemma 6.16,
JDB5 ⊢ t ′! (x1) : x1 : P1 → ¬s2(x2) : ¬x1 : P1.
By syllogism, (37) is provable in JDB5. It remains to repeat the final steps of the proof of Lemma 6.17(5). 
Corollary 6.18 (Realizability of Modal Rules). The following nested rules are realizable:
(1) the b-rule in JT5;
(2) the 4-rule in JT5 and JB5;
(3) the 5-rule in JB4;
(4) the t-rule in JDB4 and JDB5.
Proof. Using Lemma 6.17, we can prove realizability of the shallow rules in the respective justification logics by repeating
the proof of Lemma 5.15, replacing each use of the axiom jbwith A → ?s :¬s :¬A, of the axiom j4 for JT5with s :A → t!(s) : s :A,
of the axiom j4 for JB5 with s : A → t ′! (s) : s : A, and of the axiom j5 with ¬s : A → t?(s) : ¬s : A. Note also that the axiom jt is
derivable in both JDB4 and JDB5. The realizability of the nested rules follows from Lemma 4.11. 
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Remark 6.19 (Why ?¯ is Not ?). In [10], we used a single operation ? to formulate both the axioms j5 and jb. This decisionwas
motivated by a desire to minimize the number of operations on justifications. It was possible to use ? to realize the modal
axiom b in JT5 because A → ?s : ¬s : ¬A is provable in JT5 (cf. Lemma 6.17(1)). Hence, JB embeds in JT5 by an operation
translation that replaces ?¯ with ?. However, the same operation translation does not embed JB in J5; nor does the inverse
operation translation that replaces ? with ?¯ embed J5 in JB. In fact, no operation translation embeds JB in J5 or J5 in JB.
Indeed, if JB⊆˜J5, then, by the proof of Lemma 6.5 and by Theorem 5.16, KB = JB◦ ⊆ J5◦ = K5, which is not the case since
themodal axiom b is not provable in K5. An analogous argument shows that J5 does not embed in JB. Since each of J5 and JB
can be viewed as J supplied with the definition of ? and of ?¯ respectively, the argument just given shows that ? and ?¯ are
different operations.
Theorem 6.20 (Equivalences).
(1) JB4 ≡ JB5 ≡ JB45.
(2) JT5 ≡ JT45 ≡ JTB45 ≡ JTB4 ≡ JDB4 ≡ JDB45 ≡ JDB5 ≡ JTB5.
Proof. To show each embedding, according to Corollary 6.15, it is sufficient to provide an operation translation ω such that
for every axiom S of one logic, the formula schema Sω is provable in the other. In the following proof, we provide such an ω
for each embedding. Recall that all the extensions of J have common language.
(1) Since ≡ is an equivalence relation induced by ⊆˜, it is sufficient to show a circular chain of three embeddings:
JB4⊆˜JB5⊆˜JB45⊆˜JB4.
JB4⊆˜JB5: Let ω!-elim agree with the identity operation translation ωid (see the proof of Lemma 6.7), except that
ω!-elim(!) := t ′! (x1). Since each axiom S of JB4, except for j4, is also an axiom of JB5 and since its formula representation
does not contain !, Sω!-elim = S is provable in JB5. For the only remaining axiom, j4,
(x1 : P1 → !x1 : x1 : P1)ω!-elim = x1 : P1 → t ′! (x1) : x1 : P1, (38)
which is provable in JB5 by Lemma 6.17(3).
JB5⊆˜JB45: Follows from Lemma 6.7.
JB45⊆˜JB4: Letω?-elim agree withωid, except thatω?-elim(?) := t?(x1). Since each axiom S of JB45, except for j5, is also an
axiom of JB4 and since its formula representation does not contain ?, Sω?-elim = S is provable in JB4. For the only remaining
axiom, j5,
(¬x1 : P1 → ?x1 : ¬x1 : P1)ω?-elim = ¬x1 : P1 → t?(x1) : ¬x1 : P1, (39)
which is provable in JB4 by Lemma 6.17(4).
(2) Again, it is sufficient to demonstrate a circular chain of eight embeddings:
JT5 ⊆˜ JT45 ⊆˜ JTB45 ⊆˜ JTB4 ⊆˜ JDB4 ⊆˜ JDB45 ⊆˜ JDB5 ⊆˜ JTB5 ⊆˜ JT5.
Among these, four are immediate from Lemma 6.7:
JT5 ⊆˜ JT45, JT45 ⊆˜ JTB45, JDB4 ⊆˜ JDB45, and JDB5 ⊆˜ JTB5.
We now prove the remaining four embeddings.
JTB45⊆˜JTB4: The operation translation ω?-elim defined above witnesses the embedding. Indeed, as in the case of
JB45⊆˜JB4, all the axioms of JTB45, except for j5, remain axioms in JTB4 and their formula representations do not contain ?.
As noted above, the operation translation (39) of the formula representation of j5 is provable in JB4 and, hence, in its
extension JTB4.
JTB4⊆˜JDB4: The identity operation translationωid witnesses the embedding. Indeed, since for each axiom S of JTB4, we
have Sωid = S, it remains to note that all but one axiom of JTB4 remain axioms in JDB4. The only remaining axiom, jt, with
a formula representation x1 : P1 → P1, is provable in JDB4 by Lemma 6.17(5).
JDB45⊆˜JDB5: The operation translation ω!-elim defined above witnesses the embedding. Indeed, as in the case of
JB4⊆˜JB5, all the axioms of JDB45, except for j4, remain axioms in JDB5 and their formula representations do not contain !.
As noted above, the operation translation (38) of the formula representation of j4 is provable in JB5 and, hence, in its
extension JDB5.
JTB5⊆˜JT5: Let ω?¯-elim agree with ωid, except that ω?¯-elim(?¯) := ?x1. Since each axiom S of JTB5, except for jb, is also an
axiom of JT5 and since its formula representation does not contain ?¯, Sω?¯-elim = S is provable in JT5. For the only remaining
axiom, jb,
(P1 → ?¯x1 : ¬x1 : ¬P1)ω?¯-elim = P1 → ?x1 : ¬x1 : ¬P1,
which is provable in JT5 by Lemma 6.17(1). 
Now we are ready to prove the modular realization theorem. It states that any modal logic can be realized by each of its
justification counterparts, as defined on p. 6.
Theorem 6.21 (Modular Realization). LetML be a modal logic and let JL be one of its justification counterparts. Then JL◦ = ML.
Moreover, for each A′ ∈ ML, there exists a properly annotated version A of it and a realization function r on A such that JL ⊢ Ar .
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Proof. All the modal logics, except for KB5 and S5, have only one justification counterpart, for which the statement of the
theorem was proved in Theorem 5.16.
Let S5 ⊢ A′. By Theorem 5.16, there exists a properly annotated version A of A′ and a realization function r on A such that
JT45 ⊢ Ar . Let JL be any justification counterpart of S5. By Theorem 6.20, JL ≡ JT45; hence, by Lemma 6.6, there exists
a realization function r2 on A such that JL ⊢ Ar2 . Clearly, (Ar2)◦ = A′; hence, A′ ∈ JL◦. For the converse, JT45◦ = S5 by
Theorem 5.16. Since JL ≡ JT45, it follows from Lemma 6.5 that JL◦ = S5.
The proof for KB5 is analogous, except that JB45 is used in place of JT45. 
Corollary 6.22. For two justification logics JL1 and JL2, we have JL1 ≡ JL2 iff (JL1)◦ = (JL2)◦. In particular, there exist distinct
justification logics that are equivalent. It then follows that one logic may embed in the other without being its subset.
Remark 6.23. Alternatively, the modular realization theorem can be obtained by using the fact that, by Corollary 6.18 and
Fact 4.9, each rule of the sequent system S5 (KB5) is realizable in every justification counterpart of the logic S5 (KB5). The
modular realization theorem can thus be proved similarly to Theorem 5.16, using Theorem 4.12.
7. Conclusions
We have presented a general method to prove realization theorems constructively and uniformly. It can be applied to
any modal logic captured by a cut-free nested sequent system. Proving a realization theorem is reduced to dealing with the
non-nested versions of rules, which are essentially ordinary sequent rules without side formulas. In particular, the method
has enabled us to realize the 15 modal logics of the modal cube. In the process, we have reproved in a uniform way several
known realization theorems and have realized modal logics that did not have justification counterparts before.
We have demonstrated that the realization for these 15 modal logics can be made modular, independent of whether the
modal sequent systems are. Our realization theorem is modular in the sense that we produce a justification counterpart
for each axiomatization of a modal logic. This modularity has been achieved by introducing an equivalence relation on
justification logics that is based on translations of justification operations. This equivalence relation is natural in that
justification logics are equivalent iff they realize the samemodal logic. Although themodular systems from [11] have turned
out to be incomplete, our method should be easily applicable to the corrected versions of these systems that Brünnler and
Straßburger are working on.
Since we have introduced new justification logics, an obvious next step is to look for appropriate semantics and proof
systems and to investigate the decidability and complexity of these logics. Further, it could be interesting to explore the
connections between the equivalence of justification logics and their decidability and complexity, e.g., whether equivalent
logics are necessarily in the same complexity class.
It remains an open problem whether each valid annotated formula A can be realized with the additional restriction on a
realization function r that whenever 32nB is a subformula of A, the variable xn should not occur in Br . This restriction, called
non-self-referentiality on variables, was introduced by Fitting in [16]. The main difficulty of obtaining this extra condition via
our realization method lies in the contraction rule.
In this paper, we have only considered justification logics with unrestricted axiom necessitation rule. This rule is often
restricted by the so-called constant specifications. We are confident that our results can be extended to logics with arbitrary
schematic and axiomatically appropriate constant specifications.
A major open problem is to establish realizability of the cut-rule, or equivalently of modus ponens. It is not known
whether cut is realizable with respect to the definition we have given or with respect to some other suitable definition
of a realizable rule. A positive answer to this question would allow for direct realization proofs via Hilbert systems and,
thus, would probably lead to new realization theorems—for modal logics that lack cut-free systems even in nested calculi,
e.g., for logics of common knowledge (cf. [12]).
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